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Articles
Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Chinese
Grassroots Courts? Rural Land Disputes Between
Married-Out Women and Village Collectives
BY PETER C.H. CHAN†
This Article tests Galanter’s party capability theory in China’s grassroots courts by
empirically examining 858 sampled judgments of rural land dispute lawsuits between marriedout women (the “have-nots,” or the less resourceful party) and village collectives (the
“haves,” or the more resourceful party) throughout China from 2009 to 2017. An analysis of
this study’s results yields a groundbreaking discovery, the “have-nots” came out ahead in
China’s courts by a substantial margin. This finding contradicts Galanter’s theory—under
which the “haves” should prevail—and the established view that the “haves” should come out
ahead in China (a leading study on Shanghai courts found the “haves” prevailing by large
margins). This discovery is significant because the Chinese judicial system, like its
counterparts in other authoritarian states, is commonly seen as a system that favors the
“haves” in a disproportionate manner due to the lack of judicial independence, which
enhances the likelihood of courts being swayed by powerful external influence in favor of the
stronger party. This Article argues that Galanter’s theory is inapplicable, as the data shows,
when courts favor the “have-nots” over the “haves.” It is believed that the courts’ favor for
the “have-nots” neutralized the party-capability advantages enjoyed by the “haves” and
propelled the “have-nots” to victory.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the groundbreaking work of Marc Galanter,1 the party capability
theory has generated extensive scholarship. The theory suggests that the
disparity of parties’ status and resources (or relative party capability)2 is the
determining factor of litigation success. It is believed that the “haves,” usually
referring to the repeat player (RP) with more experience, greater resources, and
superior status, will “come out ahead” in court.3 The “have-nots,” who are
usually one-shotters (OS), are less resourceful and in disadvantaged positions.4
Galanter’s theory, which focused on the U.S. judicial system, has been tested
(with varying conclusions) in later studies on other jurisdictions, such as
Canada, 5 Australia, 6 Israel, 7 Russia, 8 the Philippines, 9 and England. 10 The
varying conclusions could be the result of differences in legal culture, the role
and authority of the judiciary, and the political underpinnings of the justice
system. The party capability theory was also tested in China (emphasizing
courts in Shanghai) by He and Su, where it was revealed that the “haves” came
out ahead by substantial margins (“He and Su’s Study”).11
The present study tests Galanter’s theory by examining rural land dispute
lawsuits in Chinese grassroots courts between married-out women (MOW) 12
as plaintiffs, and village collectives as defendants13 (“MOW lawsuits”). MOW
are rural women married to outsiders—either based in cities or in other
villages—who chose to retain their household registration (hukou) in their
1. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9Law& SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
2. Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 120, 121–22 (2013).
3. Galanter, supra note 1, at 97–104.
4. Id.
5. See Peter McCormick, Party Capability Theory and Appellate Success in the Supreme Court of
Canada, 1949–1992, 26 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 523, 524–25 (1993).
6. See Reginald S. Sheehan & Kirk A. Randazzo, Explaining Litigant Success in the High Court of
Australia, 47 AUSTRALIAN J. POL. SCI. 239, 239–40 (2012).
7. See Yoav Dotan, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities in Ideological
Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 1059, 1059–61 (1999).
8. See Kathryn Hendley et al., Do Repeat Players Behave Differently in Russia? Contractual and
Litigation Behavior of Russian Enterprises, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 833, 833–34 (1999).
9. See Stacia L. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes in the Philippine Supreme
Court, 56 J. POL. 752, 752–53 (1994) [hereinafter Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes];
see also Stacia L. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Regional Variation in Litigation Outcomes in the
Philippine Supreme Court, 1961–1986, 48 POL. RES. Q. 371, 371 (1995) [hereinafter Haynie, Resource
Inequalities and Regional Variation].
10. See Burton M. Atkins, Party Capability Theory as an Explanation for Intervention Behavior in the
English Court of Appeal, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 881, 882 (1991).
11. He & Su, supra note 2, at 131–32.
12. In Chinese, waijia nü (外嫁女).
13. Also known as “Rural Collective Economic Organizations.” In Chinese, nongcun jiti jingji zuzhi ( 农
村集体经济组织).
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natal village, instead of transferring their registration to their husbands’
village.14 MOW lawsuits are commenced by MOW litigants to challenge the
compensation allocation decisions of their natal village collectives.15 When the
government expropriates rural land for development, the village collective will
receive monetary compensation from the state. 16 Under law, the village
collective must distribute this monetary compensation to its members. 17
However, many village collectives refuse to distribute to MOW on the basis
that the MOW lost village collective membership the moment they married out
of the village. A number of national laws protect women’s rural land rights
provided they are members of the village collective.18 However, the law also
protects “village autonomy” under which the villagers’ committees (or village
assemblies) are given wide discretion in deciding internal matters relating to

14. MOW are very likely to retain their household registrations in their natal village, because if they
transferred the registrations to their husbands’ villages, it is likely that the MOW would not be entitled to any
land rights in their husbands’ village due to China’s land policy. See Ellen R. Judd, No Change for Thirty
Years: The Renewed Question of Women’s Land Rights in Rural China, 38 DEV. & CHANGE 689, 694 (2007);
see also Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa (农村土地承包法) [Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1, 2003)
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2002-08/30/content_5299419.htm, art. 20 (China); Tudi Guanli Fa ( 土
地 管 理 法 ) [Land Management Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25,
1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2004-10/21/content_5334569.htm, art. 14
(China).
15. Galanter, supra note 1, at 110. MOW lawsuits, in which the OS sues the RP, are considered under
Galanter’s theory as non-routine cases that:
“usually represent[] the attempt of some OS to invoke outside help to create leverage on an
organization with which he has been having dealings but is now at the point of divorce ......... The
OS claimant generally has little interest in the state of the law; the RP defendant, however, is
greatly interested.”
Id.
16. In Chinese, tudi zhengshou buchang feiyong (土地征收补偿费用). See Wuquan Fa ( 物权法)
[Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007)
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2007-03/16/content_366956.htm art. 132 (China).
17. See Guanyu Shenli Sheji Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Wenti de Jieshi (关于
审理涉及农村土地承包纠纷案件适用法律问题的解释) [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on
Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of Rural Land Contracting Dispute Cases] (promulgated by
Sup. People’s Ct., July 29, 2005, effective Sept. 1, 2005) art. 24, (China) (“Rural collective economic
organization, or village committee, or villagers’ group, conforming to the democratic procedure provided by
laws, can allocate the compensation of land expropriation inside the collective. Courts should uphold the claim
for equal rights of allocation of the individuals, who had owned the membership before the allocation
agreement for compensation for the land expropriation was set down.”).
18. See, e.g., Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa (妇女权益保障法) [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights
and Interests] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, effective Oct. 1, 1992)
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/05/content_5004563.htm, art. 30–33 (China); see also Cunmin
Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa (村民委员会组织法) [Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Oct. 28, 2010) http://www.gov.cn/flfg/201010/28/content_1732986.htm, art. 27 (China); Hunyin Fa ( 婚姻法) [Marriage Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective
Jan. 1, 1981)
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment421.aspx?AttachmentType=1, art. 39(2) (China); Law on
Land Contract in Rural Areas, art. 6, 30.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2019]

RURAL LAND DISPUTES

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

7

the rural community.19 In practice, the line of this autonomy is unclear.20 The
Supreme People’s Court’s (“SPC”) Explanation on Rural Land Contract,21
which is frequently referred to by courts when dealing with MOW lawsuits,
made clear that courts should uphold equal rights in the allocation of
compensation regarding women who hold the village collective membership
prior to the conclusion of the allocation process. 22 Despite having gender
equality statutes, 23 the law fails to provide a nationwide test for village
collective membership. In practice, the village collective applies its own test to
determine membership, which in its view, is within its “autonomy.” 24 Many
village collectives took advantage of this lacuna in the law to deny the MOW’s
entitlement to compensation, arguing that the MOW ceased to be members of
the collective the moment they were married.25 From the village collective’s
perspective, the problem is not about the MOW getting married, but rather,
marrying out of the village. Chinese customs consider that once she marries
out, a woman becomes part of her husband’s village and no longer qualifies as
a member of her natal village.26

19. See, e.g., Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees art. 24 (“The following matters that involve the
interests of the villagers shall be dealt with only upon the villagers’ assembly’s decision through
discussion . . . . Proposals on the use and distribution of land-use compensation fees . . . . Other matters
involving villagers’ interests which the villagers’ assembly believes should be decided by it through
discussion.”); see also id. art. 1–3, 5, 8; XIANFA art. 17, 111 (1982) (China).
20. The SPC has invited the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) to issue an
interpretation to provide for a nationwide test for “village collective membership status.” See Gaofa Chutai
Shenli Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian de Jieshi (Dawen) (高法出台审理农村土地承包纠纷案件的
解 释 ( 答 问 )) [Q&A of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding the Promulgation of the Interpretations of the
Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of Rural Land Contracting
Dispute Cases], Zhōngguó fǎyuàn wǎng (中国法院网) [CHINA COURT NETWORK] http://sientechina.china.
com.cn/chinese/2005/Jul/927977.htm (China). No interpretation has been provided by the NPCSC to date.
21. Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of
Rural Land Contracting Dispute Cases, art. 24.
22. Id.
23. But see Xin He, Why Did They Not Take on the Disputes? Law, Power and Politics in the DecisionMaking of Chinese Courts, 3 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 203, 209 (2007) (“[T]here are no clear regulations on this
issue, or relevant regulations are contradictory.”).
24. Some guidance can be found in provincial rules, but it is ultimately a question to be decided by the
village collective. See Guangdong Sheng Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Guanli Guiding (广东省农村集体经济组
织管理规定) [Organic Regulations of the Guangdong Province Village Economic Cooperation Associations]
(promulgated by the Guangdong Province Government, May 31, 2013, effective June 20, 2013),
zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006939748/201306/t20130620_378332.html (China); Zhejiang Sheng Cun Jingji Hezuoshe
Zuzhi Tiaoli ( 浙江省村经济合作社组织条例) [Organic Regulations of the Zhejiang Province Village
Economic Cooperation Associations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Zhejiang Province,
Sept.
28,
2007,
effective
Jan.
1,
2008),
https://www.pkulaw.com/lar/897cb583f2d7451f50c4e0a43e60e8d1bdfb.html?keyword=%E6%B5%99%E6%
B1%9F%E7%9C%81%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%90%88%E4%BD%9C%E7%A4%BE%E7%BB%8
4%E7%BB%87 (China).
25. He mentioned that “a more direct reason for such a decision [to exclude MOW] is that additional
persons to share a given lump sum of benefits will inevitably reduce the value of each share.” See He, supra
note 23, at 207.
26. Judd, supra note 14, at 690.
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MOW lawsuits fit well into the dichotomy of “haves” and “have-nots,”
given the clear “asymmetric relationship” between the village collectives and
the MOW. 27 With fewer resources (as an individual OS-litigant) and an
inferior social status (being the subject of discrimination), MOW litigants fall
squarely into the category of the “have-nots.” The village collective, on the
other hand, fits neatly into the category of “haves” as a quasi-administrative
rural institution with government backing (and also as an RP-litigant). This is
the first time Galanter’s theory has been tested on a single-issue litigation in
Chinese courts that impacts gender equality.28 This study finds, contrary to
Galanter’s theory and He and Su’s Study, the “have-nots” (the MOW) in fact
came out ahead. This finding provides a breakthrough in the understanding of
how resource inequality of parties affects litigation outcomes in a developing
authoritarian state.
Part I begins with a discussion of the debate on the party capability theory
and testing the theory on Chinese courts. Part II provides an overview of the
issue of MOW’s land rights in China. Part III outlines the data, methodology,
and variables, and Part IV presents the empirical findings. The main discovery
is the “have-nots” (the MOW) came out ahead by a substantial margin,
contradicting Galanter’s theory and the findings in He and Su’s Study. In
addition, an analysis is conducted to identify the variations of the MOW’s
success rate by a number of relevant independent variables. Although it does
not reveal the causal relations between the independent variables and the
MOW litigant’s success rate, it enriches the literature in this area. 29 This
Article ends with an explanation of why the “have-nots” (the MOW) came out
ahead and other observations from the data in Part IV, and the implications of
the findings in Part V.

27. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 884–85.
28. He and Su’s Study was on multiple types of litigations involving different kinds of parties. He & Su,
supra note 2, at 127.
29. See KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN CHINA (2017);
He, supra note 23; He & Su, supra note 2. Also see the body of literature debating Galanter’s party capability
theory. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s
Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811 (1999).
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I. TESTING GALANTER’S PARTY CAPABILITY THEORY ON CHINESE COURTS:
LEGAL BATTLES BETWEEN MARRIED-OUT WOMEN (“HAVE-NOTS”) AND
VILLAGE COLLECTIVES (“HAVES”)
A. DEBATING GALANTER’S THEORY
Due to the disparity of status, litigation experience, and resources,
Galanter “expect[ed] an RP to play the litigation game differently from an
OS.”30 The strategic advantages of the RP are seen in its rich experience in
litigating the issue (i.e. understanding how the game is played), superior
expertise (for example, quality legal representation and experts), its influence
over the institutional decision-makers, its ability to push for “ruledevelopment” that works in its favor, and the resources to pursue either or both
the short-term and long-term goals in litigation.31
This is contrasted with the position of the OS, who is inexperienced, has
limited resources, lacks the institutional advantages that the RP has, and is only
able to pursue short-term goals in litigation.32 The stakes in the individual case
are much higher for the OS than the RP, which allows the RP to “play the
odds.”33 In other words, the RP can afford to risk losing an individual case if
doing so can bring about long-term benefits. The OS does not have this luxury,
as too much is at stake in the individual case.
Galanter’s theory suggests, even in systems that place a high premium on
procedural fairness and impartiality, the strategic advantages of the RP are
unaffected.34 One reason to explain this is the RP is able to outspend the OS in
litigation and make procedural maneuvers that only someone with the RP’s
resources can afford. A typical tactic is to delay the litigation as much as
possible so that the OS is drained of all of its funds. The institutional
advantages available to the RP, including its ability to push for rule
development, ensure that the “rules of the game” are tilted in the RP’s favor.35
Many studies have confirmed Galanter’s theory,36 with some confirming
it in principle but providing revisions and qualifications to the theory.37 Some
30. Galanter, supra note 1, at 98.
31. Id. at 99–103.
32. Id. at 98.
33. Id. at 99–100.
34. He & Su, supra note 2, at 122.
35. Galanter, supra note 1, at 102–03.
36. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 882 (testing and confirming Galanter’s theory in the English Court of
Appeal); see also Donald J. Farole Jr., Reexamining Litigant Success in State Supreme Courts, 33 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1043, 1054 (1999) (generally confirming Galanter’s theory by analyzing data from five state
supreme courts of the United States); McCormick, supra note 5, at 523–25 (affirming the party capability
theory in the Canadian Supreme Court); Songer et al., supra note 29, at 830 (finding the “haves” came out
ahead in the federal courts of appeals in the United States over a sixty-four-year period).
37. See Beth Harris, Representing Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation Strategies, 33 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 911, 911–12 (1999) (arguing that “by skillfully combining adversarial legal tactics with
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studies have directly questioned whether the “haves” always come out ahead.
For instance, a study conducted on the Israeli High Court of Justice found that
the “have-nots,” when represented, came out ahead.38 Another study suggested
that the participation of amicus curiae in aid of the OS could neutralize the
advantages enjoyed by the RP.39 An important study on the U.S. Supreme
Court contradicted Galanter’s theory by finding that the “ideological
composition” of the Court was the determining factor for litigation success.40
The most forceful rebuttal of Galanter’s theory comes from Stacia
Haynie,41 who argued that while Galanter’s theory is proven to be generally
accurate in industrialized societies, it may not be applicable to developing
“non-industrialized” states.42 Using the Philippine Supreme Court as a test
case, Haynie argued that courts in developing states do not enjoy the same kind
of legitimacy as enjoyed by their counterparts in industrialized nations.43 This
legitimacy is crucial for stability and development.44 In the developed world,
the public views the courts as generally impartial and fair.45 This is not so in
developing states, where the courts are considered to be partial (favoring the
privileged) and even corrupt.46 The presumption of judicial bias towards the
“haves” creates instability, something that greatly concerns the courts of
developing countries, especially when under authoritarian rule (in Haynie’s
test case, the Marcos era).47 In an attempt to establish their legitimacy, courts
in developing countries will purposefully side with the “have-nots,” using
“their policy-making function to redistribute resources, at least within some

collaboration, poverty lawyers can transform judicial decisions into ‘symbolic resources’ to leverage the
implementation of redistributive remedies”); see also Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the “Haves” Still Come Out
Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803, 810 (1999) (arguing that “the relative advantages between and among
litigants is more nuanced and dynamic than the terms one shotter and repeat player suggest”); Sheehan &
Randazzo, supra note 6, at 253–54 (arguing “that party capability theory needs to expand beyond the Galanter
hypothesis, and define more broadly party capability as determined by litigant characteristics, legal structures
and legal cultures”); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State
Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403, 443 (1987) (finding the “haves” came out ahead in
U.S. state supreme courts, but only by a thin margin); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on
Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 254
(1992) (finding the “haves” came out ahead in U.S. Courts of Appeals).
38. Dotan, supra note 7, at 1071–72.
39. Donald Songer et al., Why the Haves Don’t Always Come Out Ahead: Repeat Players Meet Amici
Curiae for the Disadvantaged, 53 POL. RES. Q. 537, 547–48 (2000).
40. Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the
Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 470 (1992).
41. See generally Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9 (discovering that
the “have-nots” came out ahead in the Philippine Supreme Court).
42. Id. at 753.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 754.
45. Id. at 753.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 764.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2019]

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

RURAL LAND DISPUTES

11

components of their docket, thus potentially increasing their own legitimacy
and stability within the political system.”48
B.

TESTING GALANTER’S THEORY ON CHINESE COURTS

He and Su’s Study confirmed the party capability theory, but argued that
factors other than resource inequality also contributed to the “haves’"
success. 49 A major factor is that Chinese courts are particularly prone to
outside influences, especially influence from the government.50 It is argued
that the lack of judicial independence has augmented the power imbalance
between the “haves” and the “have-nots.”51 He and Su’s Study covered a wide
range of disputes involving litigants of different natures: businesses, farmers,
non-farmer individuals, and government agencies or government-related
companies. 52 Government agencies or government-related companies, who
were RPs, turned out to be the most successful litigants, while farmers, who
were OSs, were the most unsuccessful.53 In other words, the central finding of
He and Su’s Study is that under the Chinese judicial system, the “have-nots,”
who are individual OS-litigants from an underprivileged group, lose the most
to the “haves,” who are institutional RP-litigants with governmental backing.54
This finding was confirmed in another study on the media’s success rate in
defamation litigation in China.55 It was revealed that “the media’s odds of
success would be reduced by 76 per cent if they were sued by the government
and officials, comparing with the odds when they were sued by nongovernment officials or non-government organizations.”56 Another study has
found that Chinese courts favored “politically connected” corporate litigants.57

48. Id. at 753.
49. He & Su, supra note 2, at 139 (“Given our data, one could continue to argue that resources still make
a difference. That is to say, the party capability thesis remains intact, if not sufficient, to explain away the
winning gap between the haves and the have-nots.”).
50. Id. at 140–41 (“The existing empirical studies suggest that resource difference is one of the foremost
reasons why the haves come out ahead, but when the courts are susceptible to external influences, this could
overshadow any other reasons, including litigation capacity.” (citation omitted)).
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id. at 132 tbl.2.
53. See id. at 131–32.
54. Id.
55. Xin He & Fen Lin, The Losing Media? An Empirical Study of Defamation Litigation in China, 230
CHINA Q. 371, 385–86 (2017).
56. Id.
57. Haitian Lu et al., Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate
Lawsuits, 58 J.L. & ECON. 829, 857 (2015) (finding “robust empirical evidence that firms’ political
connectedness, in the form of state ownership or management’s personal political ties in private firms, is
associated with better court outcomes. This likely reflects the fact that the state uses its nonindependent
judiciary to redistribute wealth from parties that are not politically favored to those that are.”). But see Wei
Cui, Does Judicial Independence Matter? A Study of the Determinants of Administrative Litigation in an
Authoritarian Regime, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 941, 950 (2017) (stating that plaintiffs (OS) are losing to the tax
authorities (RP) in administrative litigations, but arguing that it is the result of “information asymmetry” and
adverse legal rules, rather than the courts favoring the tax authorities).
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Similar to the farmers in He and Su’s Study, the MOW are individual OSlitigants from an underprivileged group that is under constant discrimination.
Rural land policies are often “invisibly ‘gendered’”58 or perpetuate “traditional
and new forms of gender discrimination.”59 By marrying outsiders, MOW are
considered “outsiders” by their natal villages.60 An MOW’s rights to receive
government compensation are taken away from them on the basis that they are
no longer “members” of the village collective. MOW are usually
underrepresented in rural governance,61 giving them close to no say in the
compensation allocation process.
Similar to the government agencies or government-related companies in
He and Su’s Study, village collectives are government-backed rural
administrative institutions. The government adopts a policy of “village
autonomy,” giving village collectives extensive administrative powers over
internal rural matters.62 The village collective has to deal with numerous MOW
lawsuits each year, making it an obvious RP. As a rural collective institution, it
has at its disposal far greater resources than the MOW litigants (individuals),
which are not limited to money, but extend to connections with the
government, local courts, and other institutions that could provide help in
litigations of this nature. The stakes are inevitably much higher for the MOW
than the village collective. This allows the village collective, in the words of
Galanter, to “play the odds.”63
If one follows the findings from He and Su’s Study, the village collective,
as the government-backed and “politically connected” institutional RP, should
unquestionably prevail over the MOW, the underprivileged individual OSlitigants. Is this really the case? As this study will show, contrary to the party
capability theory, MOW litigants (the “have-nots”) are winning these lawsuits
by a substantial margin.64

58. Laurel Bossen, Reproduction and Real Property in Rural China: Three Decades of Development and
Discrimination, in WOMEN, GENDER AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 97, 98 (Tamara Jacka & Sally
Sargeson eds., 2011).
59. Junjie Chen & Gale Summerfield, Gender and Rural Reforms in China: A Case Study of Population
Control and Land Rights Policies in Northern Liaoning, 13 FEMINIST ECON. 63, 83 (2007).
60. Neky Tak-ching Cheung, A Religious Menopausal Ritual: Changing Body, Identity, and Values, in
GENDERING CHINESE RELIGION: SUBJECT, IDENTITY, AND BODY 225, 239 (Jinhua Jiaet al. eds., 1st ed. 2014).
61. BAOGANG HE, RURAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS 126–28 (2007).
62. See Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees art. 24.
63. Galanter, supra note 1, at 99–100.
64. Out of the 858 sampled cases, the MOW litigants won 93.90% of the time (combining “complete
win” (76.50%) and “partial win” (17.4%)). See infra Table 4. The MOW litigant only lost 6.20% of the time.
See infra Table 4.
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DO THE “HAVES” COME OUT AHEAD IN MARRIED-OUT WOMEN
LAWSUITS?—TWO PROPOSITIONS
1.

Proposition 1: Why the “Haves” (Village Collectives) Should Come
Out Ahead in China

Previous studies show that civil remedies were rarely available to MOW
litigants,65 as courts were unwilling to extend their civil jurisdiction to cover
MOW cases.66 Even when courts accept their cases, courts tend to favor the
village collectives given their status as quasi-governing institutions in the rural
regions. The courts are more concerned about maintaining stability and
ensuring that the rural collectives’ interests are not jeopardized by challenges
from the MOW litigants. This view is consistent with the policy of “village
autonomy,” that rural matters should be handled by representatives of the
village.67
The lack of judicial independence means Chinese courts are susceptible
to external interference. In the rural political context, the village collective
wields far greater power than the individual MOW litigants (who lack social
and political connections). Thus, the village collective is far more capable of
influencing the courts. Courts may also be concerned that if the MOW litigants
get what they wanted, it would open a floodgate of litigation against the village
collectives, resulting in the deterioration of local stability. Galanter’s theory
should apply given the clear resource asymmetry between the parties. In this
case, the judicial politics in China would augment the advantages enjoyed by
the “haves” (village collectives).
2.

Proposition 2: Why the “Have-Nots” (Married-Out Women) Should
Come Out Ahead in China

It is possible that the courts side with the MOW to uphold gender
equality, or even out of sympathy for the MOW litigants. Despite policy
constraints and bureaucratic red-tape, Chinese courts, as any courts in the
world, inherently seek to do justice whenever possible. Most of the legislative

65. Xiaoli Wang (王晓莉) & Huiying Li（李慧英), Woguo Nongcun Tudi Zhengce yu Shijian Fenxi (我
国农村土地政策与实践分析—聚焦农村妇女土地权益问题) [Land Policies and Practice in Rural China:
Focusing on Rural Women’s Land Rights and Interests], Kēxué Shèhuì Zhǔyì ( 科 学 社 会 主 义 ) [SCI.
SOCIALSIM] 116, 118 (2014) (China).
66. See He, supra note 23, at 210.
67. The power relationship between grassroots courts and the rural administration (township government
and rural collectives) is deep-seated and complex. While grassroots courts are not answerable to the rural
administration, the informal powers wielded by the rural administration sometimes make it impossible for
courts not to take into account their vested interests. In some regions, courts take the view that issues relating
to MOW are within the ambit of village autonomy and refuse to “interfere.” Even when courts are bold in
defending MOW’s land rights, resistance from the rural collective could delay or block enforcement.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

14

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

[Vol. 71:1

provisions favor the MOW. 68 It would be difficult for the court not to enforce
pro-MOW rules, unless there were overriding policy concerns.69 The risk of
instability arising from MOW disputes is low. It would be a relatively “safe”
domain for the courts to simply apply the laws that protect the MOW.70
Echoing Haynie’s theory, it can also be argued that the courts in China
need to establish their legitimacy through adopting a redistributive policy when
adjudicating MOW lawsuits, which might result in the “have-nots”
prevailing.71 The institutional disadvantages of the Chinese judiciary can be
reversed through establishing a public image that the courts are protectors of
the “have-nots.” This legitimacy-building exercise benefits not just the court
system, but also individual judges who now post their judgments online.
II. THE ISSUE OF MARRIED-OUT WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS IN CHINA: AN
OVERVIEW
A. BACKGROUND
Rural women around the world, especially in developing countries,
continue to suffer from the rural gender gap. Some argue the primary cause of
the rural gender gap was the deprivation or suppression of rural women’s
rights to access and own land. 72 The negative impact on rural women is
augmented by trends in some communities, such as in Vietnam and India,
where more rural men are now engaging in non-agricultural activities, leaving
the rural women to farm the land that is usually owned by male members of the

68. See supra text accompanying note 18.
69. For example, if the losing village collective threatens to destabilize the rural community.
70. While village collective membership is legally undefined, courts may be willing to fill this gap by
finding in favor of the MOW as long as they can show some connection with their natal villages. Connection
with the MOW’s natal village will be discussed in detail and empirically tested below.
71. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9, at 769; Haynie, Resource
Inequalities and Regional Variation, supra note 9, at 378.
72. See, e.g., Bina Agarwal, Gender and Command over Property: A Critical Gap in Economic Analysis
and Policy in South Asia, 22 WORLD DEV. 1455, 1467 (1994); see also Nuria Pena et al., Using Rights-Based
and Gender-Analysis Arguments for Land Rights for Women: Some Initial Reflections from Nicaragua, 16
GENDER & DEV. 55, 67–68 (2008) (emphasizing the need for a dialogue among the multiple approaches to the
“issue of gender and land” given the complexity of the issue and that titling cannot once and for all provide
rural women full access to land if it is not accompanied by “a process that makes such rights socially
legitimate and enforceable”). But see, e.g., Cecile Jackson, Gender Analysis of Land: Beyond Land Rights for
Women?, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 453, 457 (2003) (arguing that there are multiple reasons that contribute to
the rural gender gap, and suggesting that increasing access to land for rural women, unlike rural men, does not
necessarily elevate women’s socio-economic status, given that there are so many other factors, such as “social
relations of productions,” that contribute to the inferior position of rural women vis-à-vis rural men); K.C. Roy
& C.A. Tisdell, Property Rights in Women’s Empowerment in Rural India: A Review, 29 INT’L J. SOC. ECON.
315, 332 (2002) (arguing that, in the context of rural India, “ownership rights to property are important, but
customary rights to access the property are more important for women’s empowerment”).
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family.73 As land ownership contributes to rural women’s empowerment,74 the
lack of land ownership weakens rural women. This weakness caused by
landlessness is certainly felt in rural China. In China, the problem of gender
inequality is particularly acute in rural regions where traditional Chinese
customs favor men over women.75 Rural women, including MOW, have fewer
opportunities to be educated when compared to rural men, who usually occupy
leadership roles within the rural community. According to an investigation,
rural women without land are usually less educated than those with land
entitlements in China.76 The MOW issue in China is particularly complicated
for the following reasons.
First, the national statutes have not provided a test to determine
“membership status” of the village collective.77 While many call for a unified
national standard, some argue that it is unrealistic to do so,78 partly due to the
difficulty in defining in concrete terms the concepts of “(rural) land property
rights” and “membership.”79 The diverse rules in different regions also make it
73. See Bina Agarwal, Gender and Land Rights Revisited: Exploring New Prospects via the State,
Family and Market, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 184, 192 (2003); see also Mary H. Nguyen, Rural Women’s
Property Rights in Vietnam: Weakened by Macroeconomic Reforms, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 105,
109 (2006).
74. See Khushbu Mishra & Abdoul G. Sam, Does Women’s Land Ownership Promote Their
Empowerment? Empirical Evidence from Nepal, 78 WORLD DEV. 360, 368 (2016) (“By employing several
econometric techniques and robustness checks, we find that women’s land ownership in Nepal significantly
increases their empowerment, defined by household decision-making in areas of own healthcare, major
household purchases, and visits to family or relatives.”).
75. Yang Li & Xi Yin-Sheng, Married Women’s Rights to Land in China’s Traditional Farming Areas,
15 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 621, 629 (2006).
76. Ying Luo (罗颖), Yifang Zheng (郑逸芳) & Senwei Huang (黄森慰), Nongcun Waijianü Tudi
Quanyi Baohu Qingkuang Fenxi: Jiyu Fujian Sheng 108 Fen Wenjuan Diaocha Shuju (农村外嫁女土地权益
保护情况分析——基于福建省 108 份问卷调查数据) [An Analysis on the Protection of Land Rights of
Rural Married-Out-Women: Based on 108 Pieces of Questionnaires in Fujian Province], 19 NÈIMÉNGGǓ
NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn) (内蒙古农业大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. INNER MONG.
AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 16, 20 tbl3 (2017) (China).
77. See Gaofa Chutai Shenli Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian de Jieshi (Dawen) (高法出台审理
农村土地承包纠纷案件的解释(答问)) [Q&A of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding the Promulgation of
the Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of Rural
Land Contracting Dispute Cases] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., July 29, 2005)
http://sientechina.china.com.cn/chinese/2005/Jul/927977.htm (China); Wang & Li, supra note 65, at 118.
78. Hao Tang (唐浩), Cungui Minyue Shijiao Xia de Nongdi Zhidu: Wenben Jiedu (村规民约视角下的
农地制度: 文本解读) [Rural Land in the Perspective of Village Charter: Textual Analysis], 28 ZHŌNGGUÓ
NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn) (中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)) [CHINA AGRIC. U. J. (SOC.
SCI. EDITION)] 106 (2011) (China).
79. See Jing Shen (申静) & Hansheng Wang (王汉生), Jiti Chanquan Zai Zhongguo Xiangcun Shenghuo
zhong de Shijian Luoji—Shehuixue Shijiao xia de Chanquan Goujian Guocheng (集体产权在中国乡村生活
中的实践逻辑——社会学视角下的产权构建过程) [The Practical Logic of Property Rights in Rural China
Life: The Process of Contracting Property Rights from the Sociological Perspective], 115 SHÈHUÌ XUÉ YÁNJIŪ
( 社 会 学 研 究 ) [SOC. RES.] 113 ， 142 (2005); see also Jing Li ( 李 菁 ) & Danli Yan ( 颜 丹 丽 ), Jiti
Chengyuanquan he Tudi Chengbao Shouyiquan de Chongtu yu Xietiao: Wending Diquan yu Buwending
Diquan de Duibi——Yi Xishui Cun Di Ba Cunmin Xiaozu Liangci Zhengdi Buchangfei Fenpei Weili (集体成
员权和土地承包收益权的冲突与协调: 稳定地权与不稳定地权的对比——以西水村第八村民小组两次征
地补偿费分配为例) [Tension and Conciliation Between Collective Member Rights and Contractual Land
Rights: A Contrast Between Stable Land Rights and Unstable Land Rights] ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGCŪN GUĀNCHÁ (
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very difficult to standardize such a practice.80 The lack of a unified legal
standard leaves room for controversy.
Second, rural governance in China is based on the principle of “village
autonomy.”81 The power to allocate and distribute rural collective income and
interests deriving from land is vested in the village collectives. As the minority,
the MOW frequently find themselves being outvoted by other villagers on the
matter of allocation of land expropriation compensation. 82 Village leaders,
even if they had the vision and resolve to protect gender equality, have to yield
to majority pressure if the majority holds a strong view of not distributing to
the MOW.83
Third, discrimination against women in China is imbued in its traditional
culture. The Chinese phrase “giving men greater weight over women,” 84
applies at least in terms of social status and legal entitlement.85 This problem is
中国农村观察) [CHINA RURAL SURV.] 26, 26–27 (2011); Tiejun Wen (温铁军), Ping Wang (王平) & Yan Shi
(石嫣), Nongcun Gaige Zhong de Caichan Zhidu Bianqian: 30 Nian 3 Ge Cunzhuang de Anli Jieshao (农村改
革中的财产制度变迁——30 年 3 个村庄的案例介绍) [Property Institution Evolution in Rural Reform:
Introducing Three Countryside Cases] ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ (中国农村经济) [CHINESE RURAL ECON.]
4, 5 (2008).
80. Some scholars term this as “legal federalism.” See Jinhua Cheng (程金华) & Zhenxing Ke (柯振兴),
Zhongguo Falü Quanli de Lianbangzhi Shijian: Yi Laodong Hetongfa Lingyu Wei Li (中国法律权力的联邦制
实践——以劳动合同法领域为例) [The Practice of Federalism in Chinese Legal System: An Empirical Study
on Labor Contract Law], FǍXUÉ JIĀ (法学家) [JURIST], 2–3 (2018).
81. Bin Wang ( 王彬), Xiangcun Shanzhi de Falü Huayuchang ( 乡村善治的法律话语场) [Legal
Discourse of Good Governance in Rural Areas] SHĀNDŌNG JǏNGCHÁ XUÉYUÀN XUÉBÀO (山东警察学院学报
) (2008) [J. SHANDONG POLICE C.] 73 [hereinafter Wang, Legal Discourse of Good Governance]; see also
Meng Hou (侯猛), Cungui Minyue de Sifa Shiyong (村规民约的司法适用) [The Application of Law on
Village Charters] FǍLǛ SHÌYÒNG (法律适用) [J.L. APPL.] 52, 52 (2010); Dongdong Huang (黄东东) & Ziyi
Wang (王子毅), Tudi Buchangfei Nonghu Jian de Fenpei: Zhixu yu Fazhi (土地补偿费农户间的分配：秩序
与 法 治 ) [Distribution of Land Compensation among Farmers: Order and Rule of Law], 35 JÍSHǑU DÀXUÉ
XUÉBÀO (SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (吉首大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. JISHOU U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 78, 79
(2014); Zhuqing Wang (王竹青), Lun Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Falü Baozhang de Tixihua Goujian (论农
村妇女土地权益法律保障的体系化构建) [Establishing Systems of Legal Protection of Rural Women’s Land
Rights and Interests] FÙNǙ YÁNJIŪ LÙN CÓNG ( 妇 女 研 究 论 丛 ) [J. CHINESE WOMEN’S STUD.] 49 (2017)
[hereinafter Wang, Establishing Systems of Legal Protection].
82. See Qiong Zou (邹琼), Cunzhuang Zhong de Xingbie Quanli: Zhusanjiao Nancun de Shizheng Yanjiu
(村庄中的性别权力—珠三角南村的实证研究) [Gender Power in Villages: An Empirical Study on Nancun
Village in Pearl River Delta], 32 GUǍNGXĪ MÍNZÚ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (ZHÉXUÉ SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (广西民族
大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. GUANGXI U. FOR NATIONALITIES (PHIL. & SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 82 (2010); see
also Jinmei Xia (夏金梅), Guanyu Nongcun Chujianü de Jiti Jingji Quanyi Baozhang: Jiyu Guangdong Sheng
S Cun de Diaocha (关于农村出嫁女的集体经济权益保障 ——基于广东省 S 村的调查) [Research on the
Protection of Collective Economic Rights of Rural Married-Out-Women: Based on Investigations in S Village,
Guangdong Province] LǏLÙN TÀNSUǑ (理论探索) [THEORETICAL EXPLORATION] 85, 85 (2011).
83. In China, rural land expropriation is the collective decision of the village collective, as rural land is
collectively owned by the village collective. See XIANFA art. 10 (1982) (China). In other words, the
government approaches the village collective, not the individual villager, to negotiate and execute the
expropriation. Individual rural women may only indirectly participate in that decision through their
representatives in the villagers’ assembly. With such rural land ownership structure, rural women in China are
placed in a disadvantaged position when compared with jurisdictions where rural property rights can directly
vest in individuals.
84. In Chinese: zhongnan qingnü (重男轻女).
85. Hou, supra note 81.
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particularly serious in rural China, where men are seen as the main contributor
of agricultural power and women are considered subordinate to their fathers
before marriage, and husbands after marriage.86 Village collectives contract
rural land to families as the “household units” to manage the land. The rightholder of the land is usually the adult male in the family.87 As MOW will
usually move to live with their husbands after getting married (patrilocal
residence),88 their family of origin will usually consider that the MOW is no
longer a member of their natal family.89 Sometimes the MOW’s families of
origin actively undermine the MOW’s land rights and other interests in the
village.90 Obviously, there will be no unfair treatment if the MOW are given
land in their husbands’ villages as new members. 91 However, due to the
national land policy of “no change for thirty years,”92 which aims to stabilize
and secure investment in rural land, it is very difficult for the MOW to obtain
any land entitlement at their husbands’ villages.93
Courts are frequently criticized for their reluctance to provide civil
remedies to MOW litigants.94 Although the PRC Constitution provides for
gender equality,95 studies have shown that courts played only a limited role in
protecting MOW’s land rights, 96 as well as in enforcing gender equality

86. See generally H. Ray Liaw, Women’s Land Rights in Rural China: Transforming Existing Laws into
a Source of Property Rights, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 237 (2008) (describing gender discrimination in rural
China, exemplified primarily by an inequitable distribution of land).
87. See Guanyu Kaizhan Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jingying Quan Dengji Shidian Gongzuo de Yijian (关
于开展农村土地承包经营权登记试点工作的意见) [Opinions on Promoting the Pilot Program of Rural Land
Contracting Registration] (promulgated by the Ministry of Agric., Feb. 5, 2011, effective Feb. 5, 2011)
(Westlaw China) (clarifying that farmers have the right to own the land); Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jingying
Quan Dengji Shidian Gongzuo Guicheng (Shixing) (农村土地承包经营权登记试点工作规程 (试行))
[Guidelines on the Pilot Program of Rural Land Contracting Registration (for Trial Implementation)]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Agric., June 27, 2012, effective June 27, 2012) (Westlaw China). MOW are
underrepresented under the Household Registration System. See Liaw, supra note 86, at 24–41, 250–51; see
also Guoshen Chen (陈国申) & Qian Gao (高倩), Tudi Quequan Beijing Xia de Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi
Wenti Yanjiu (土地确权背景下的农村妇女土地权益问题研究) [Infringement Problems of Rural Women’s
Land Rights and Interests and Countermeasures Under the Background of Land Approval] LǏNGDǍO KĒXUÉ
LÙNTÁN (领导科学论坛) [SCI. LEADERSHIP F.] 51, 53; Zou, supra note 82, at 82 (2007).
88. Li & Yin-Sheng, supra note 75, at 623; see also Liaw, supra note 86, at 239.
89. As an old Chinese saying puts it: “A daughter who marries is like spilled water that cannot be
recovered.” Li & Yin-Sheng, supra note 75, at 629. In Chinese: jia chuqu de nüer po chuqu de shui (嫁出去的
女儿泼出去的水).
90. Baoping Liu ( 刘 保 平 ) & Lanru Wan ( 万 兰 茹 ), Hebei Sheng Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Baohu
Zhuangkuang Yanjiu (河北省农村妇女土地权益保护状况研究) [Research on Protection of Women’s Rights
to Land in Rural Hebei] FÙNǙ YÁNJIŪ LÙN CÓNG (妇女研究论丛) [COLLECTION WOMEN’S STUD.] 11 (2007).
91. Liaw, supra note 86, at 242 (describing it as “a cycle of loss and gain of land upon marriage”).
92. Judd, supra note 14, at 689.
93. Liaw, supra note 86, at 242–43.
94. See, e.g., He, supra note 23, at 208.
95. XIANFA art. 48 (1982).
96. Hua Gui ( 桂 华 ), Lun Fazhi Shengyu de Xingzheng Xina: Guanyu “Waijianü” Shangfang de Tizhi
Jieshi (论法治剩余的行政吸纳—关于”外嫁女”上访的体制解释) [On Administrative Absorption of Legal
Residues: Institutional Interpretation of the Petition of “Out-Married Women” to Higher Authorities]
KĀIFÀNG SHÍDÀI (开放时代) [OPEN TIMES] 164, 165 (2017).
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legislation.97 Due to these factors, it is believed that courts are not always able
to make decisions solely on the basis of law when adjudicating these types of
disputes.98 Courts find it difficult to come up with a logical ruling when there
are gaps in the law. 99 They find it equally difficult to reconcile the
inconsistencies between village internal rules and national laws, 100 and to
enforce judgments against a defiant village collective.101 Some courts choose
97. See Hong Luo ( 罗 虹 ) & Hongwu Zhong ( 钟 宏 武 ), Zhiyue Woguo Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi
Baohu de Faxue Fenxi ( 制约我国农村妇女土地权益保护的法学分析 ) [Regulating the Protection of
Women’s Rights and Interests in China] GĀNSÙ SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ (甘肃社会科学) [GANSU SOC. SCI.] 162, 162
(2006). See generally Li & Yin-Sheng, supra note 75 (explaining that policy and law do not do enough to
close the gender gap women suffer in traditional farming areas); Liaw, supra note 86 (arguing that, despite the
proper framework to guarantee women rights in land, courts are not properly enforcing the law to actually
strengthen these rights).
98. See Chunrong Shang (商春荣) & Yueheng Zhang (张岳恒), Dangqian Woguo Nongcun Funü Tudi
Quanli Baozhang Jizhi Yanjiu (当前我国农村妇女土地权利保障机制研究) [An Analysis on the Current
Mechanisms of Protecting Rural Women’s Land Rights in China] HUÁZHŌNG NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO
(SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (华中农业大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. HUAZHONG AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 95,
96 (2010); see also Hou, supra note 81, at 54; Changjian Li (李长健) & Qiaoyun Zhang (张巧云), Woguo
Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Baohu Zhidu de Wanshan ( 我 国 农 村 妇 女 土 地 权 益 保 护 制 度 的 完 善 )
[Recommendations for Perfecting the Protection of China’s Rural Women’s Land Rights and Interests] HUÁZH
Ō NG NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (SHÈHUÌ K Ē XUÉ BǍN)) (华中农业大学学报(社会科学版)) [J. HUAZHONG
AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 77, 80 (2013); Fuzhong Yang (杨福荣), Falü zai Nongcun bei Bianyuan hua
Wenti Yanjiu: Yi Waijianü Quanyi Jiufen Wei Qierudian de Chubu Kaocha (法律在农村被边缘化问题研究
——以外嫁女权益纠纷为切入点的初步考察) [Research About Problems of Legal Marginalization in
China Rural Areas – A Preliminary Study on the Disputes Involving the Rights of Married-Out Women]
FǍXUÉ ZÁZHÌ (法学杂志) [LAW SCI. MAG.] 82, 82 (2010).
99. Liu & Wan, supra note 90; see also Yi Chen (陈屹) & Xiang Gao (高翔), Nongye Chengbao Hetong
Anjian Shenli Qingkuang ji Falü Shiyong Yanjiu: Dui Chongqing Shi Bufen Nongye Chengbao Hetong Anjian
de Fenxi (农业承包合同案件审理情况及法律适用研究：对重庆市部分农业承包合同案件的调查分析)
[Adjudication and the Application of Law in Agricultural Contract Cases: Investigations into Agricultural
Contract Cases], FǍLǛ SHÌYÒNG ( 法 律 适 用 ) [J.L. APPL.] [Erlinglingliu Nian Shiyue[Oct. 2006], at 48; Fei
Gao (高飞), Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Baohu de Kunjing yu Duice Tanxi (农村妇女土地权益保护的困境
与对策探析) [Discussion on the Difficulties on Protecting the Rights and Interests of Rural Women in Terms
of Land and Countermeasures], 23 ZHŌNGGUÓ TǓDÌ KĒXUÉ ( 中 国 土 地 科 学 ) [CHINA LAND SCI.] 47, 50
(2009); Li & Yan, supra note 79, at 27; Hailong Sun ( 孙 海 龙 ) et al., Chengshihua Beijing Xia Nongcun
Waijianü Quanyi Jiufen jiqi Jiejue Jizhi de Sikao (城市化背景下农村”外嫁女”权益纠纷及其解决机制的思
考 ) [Thoughts of Married-Out-Women’s Rights Disputes and Resolution in Rural Area in the Context of
Urbanization] FǍLǛ SHÌYÒNG (法律适用) [LAW APPL.] 26, 30 (2004).
100. Chen & Gao, supra note 99, at 49; see also Lanzhi Bo ( 柏 兰 芝 ), Jiti de Chonggou: Zhujiang
Sanjiaozhou Diqu Nongcun Chanquan Zhidu de Yanbian: Yi “Waijianü” Zhengyi wei Li (集体的重构:珠江三
角洲地区农村产权制度的演变—以”外嫁女”争议为例) [Reconstruction of the Collective: The Evolution of
Property in Rural Area of Pearl River Delta—A Case Study on Married-Out-Women Disputes] KĀIFÀNG
SHÍDÀI (开放时代) [OPEN TIMES] 109, 121 (2013); Jialiang Huang (黄家亮) & Liufen Wu (吴柳芬), Duoyuan
Zhengyi Xia de Xingdong Luoji yu Jiufen Jiejue: Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou “Waijianü” Jiufen Shizheng Yanjiu (多
元正义下的行动逻辑与纠纷解决——珠江三角洲”外嫁女”纠纷实证研究) [Action Logic and Dispute
Resolution Under the Pluralist Justice——An Empirical Research on the Dispute of “Married Daughters” in
the Countryside of Pearl River Delta], 37 GUǍNGXĪ MÍNZÚ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (ZHÉXUÉ SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN)
(广西民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. GUANGXI U. NATIONALITIES (PHIL. SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 10, 11
(2015).
101. Xiaoyun Mo (莫小云), Guangzhou Shi Baiyun Qu Nongcun Waijianü Jingji Quanyi Baohu de Sikao
(广州市白云区农村外嫁女经济权益保护的思考) [Thoughts of Protection of Rural Married-Out-Women in
Baiyun District, Guangzhou City] NÁNFĀNG JĪNGJÌ (南方经济) [SOUTH CHINA ECON.] 30, 31(2003); see also
Sun et al., supra note 99, at 30; Xia, supra note 82, at 88.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2019]

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

RURAL LAND DISPUTES

19

to reject the disputes before they can be docketed.102 In some regions, such as
in Guangdong Province, courts began to accept MOW cases, but required the
MOW to first seek administrative remedies.103 If the MOW were dissatisfied
with the administrative decision, they could then take the matter to court as an
administrative case.104
B.

EXISTING LITERATURE GAP ON THE MARRIED-OUT WOMEN ISSUE

Previous qualitative research focused on the following aspects of the
MOW issue: (1) the ramifications of the lack of civil remedies for MOW and
various ways to protect MOW land rights when civil remedies were
unavailable (for example, by introducing shareholding cooperatives);105 (2) the
suppression of rural women’s rights in traditional Chinese culture; 106 (3)
MOW’s weak position under China’s rural land policy and land ownership
102. Wanyou Mo (莫万友), Nongcun Waijianü Quanyi Baohu Wenti Tanxi: Zhusanjiao Z Shi de Shizheng
(农村外嫁女权益保护问题探析——珠三角 Z 市的实证) [On Protection of Rights and Interests of Rural
Married-Out-Women: An Empirical Study on Z City in Pearl River Delta] NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ (农村经济)
[RURAL ECON.] 94, 97 (2013).
103. Mingyong Yu (余明永) et al., Waijianü de Quanyi Baohu: Yi Guangzhou Shi Fayuan Feisu Zhixing
Anjian de Shencha yu Zhixing wei Shijiao (外嫁女的权益保护——以广州市法院非诉执行案件的审查与执
行为视角) [Protection of Rights and Interests of Married-Out-Women: From the Perspective of Adjudication
and Execution of Non-Litigation Execution Cases in Courts in Guangzhou] FǍZHÌ LÙNTÁN ( 法 治 论 坛 ) [F.
RULE L.] 21, 22–23 (2014).
104. Sun et al., supra note 99.
105. See generally Meishan Jiang ( 姜美善) & Chunrong Shang ( 商春荣), Nongcun Gufen Hezuozhi
Fazhan zhong de Funü Tudi Quanyi (农村股份合作制发展中的妇女土地权益) [Women’s Land Rights and
Interests in the Development of Rural Shareholding System] NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ (农村经济) [RURAL ECON.] 23
(2009) (discussing the trajectory of the development of shareholding cooperatives in rural China); Li & Zhang,
supra note 98 (calling for pro-MOW legislative reform and legal aid for rural women); Luo & Zhong, supra
note 97 (pointing out that the underlying factors contributing to the MOW problem are the lack of gender
consideration in China’s land policy, the conflict between the policy to stabilize land ownership/use and the
mobility of MOW, the tensions between village autonomy and national law, and the absence of civil
remedies); Chunrong Shang (商春荣), Dui Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanli Wenti de Jiexi (对农村妇女土地权利
问题的解析) [An Investigation of the Issue of Rural Women’s Right of Land], 24 SHÀNTÓU DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO
(RÉNWÉN SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (汕头大学学报(人文社会科学版)) [J. SHANTOU U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.
EDITION)] 56 (2008) (calling for the transformation of land rights into “shares” (股份化), the promotion of
gender equality in rural governance, and the regulation of villagers’ charters); Shang & Zhang, supra note 98
(suggesting greater government intervention in MOW disputes, clarifying the land rights of the MOW by
legislation, reconciling the villagers’ charters and national law, and improving education for rural women);
Wang & Li, supra note 64 (discussing the legislative (unclear rights-subjects), executive (lack of supervision
over village organizations), and judicial (refusing to take on the disputes) dimensions of the MOW issue,
suggesting that civil remedies, which were lacking, were crucial to resolving the problem).
106. See generally Hou, supra note 81 (arguing that the villager’s charter was not only a set of written
rules, but also the manifestation of the traditional community structure, and further opining that the more
united a village was, the more powerful the villagers’ charter would be, which in turn meant increased
difficulty for MOW to assert equal land rights); Jinwen Xia (夏锦文) & Xiaojie Chen (陈小洁), Quyu Fazhi
Wenhua: Yiyi Chanshi, Yunxing Jili yu Fazhan Lujing (区域法治文化：意义阐释、运行机理与发展路径)
(Area Culture of Rule of Law: Meaning, Mechanism and Development) FǍLǛ KĒXUÉ (XĪBĚI ZHÈNGFǍ DÀXUÉ
XUÉBÀO) (法律科学(西北政法大学学报)) (SCI. L. (J. NORTHWEST U. POL. SCI. L.)) 3 (2015) (explaining that
it was “area legal culture” that shaped the local rural governance framework that either protected or
discriminated against MOW, suggesting that mediation is the best tool to reconcile the tension between the
national law and local customs).
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system;107 (4) the conflict between national law and rural regulations/norms;108
and (5) the function of the petition system (xinfang) in resolving MOW land
disputes.109
Previous quantitative research focused on: (1) gender inequality in the
distribution of rural land;110 (2) the status quo of MOW’s rural land rights in
China;111 (3) the relationship between the land policy that prohibits adjustment
107. See generally Duanhong Chen ( 陈 端 洪 ), Paitaxing yu Tazhehua: Zhongguo Nongcun “Waijianü”
Anjian de Caichanquan Fenxi (排他性与他者化:中国农村”外嫁女”案件的财产权分析) (Exclusivity and
Alienation: Analysis on property rights in rural Married-Out-Women cases), 5 BĚIDÀ FǍLǛ PÍNGLÙN (北大法
律 评 论 ) [PEKING U. L. REV.] 321 (2003) (proposing a two-tier-comprehension of the “collective land right”
and inverting “usufruct of land” ( 收 益 权 ) into “shares” ( 股 份 化 ) to resolve the problem); Chen and Gao,
supra note 87 (explaining how individual women were ignored as rights-subjects in the process of “land
approval” (土地确权), a national policy intending to provide stability in land management and delegating land
rights to “households” (戶), instead of individuals); Tiejun Wen (温铁军), Nongmin Shehui Baozhang yu Tudi
Zhidu Gaige (农民社会保障与土地制度改革) (Farmers’ Social Security and Land System Reform) XUÉXÍ
YUÈKĀN (学习月刊) (STUD. MONTHLY) 20 (2006) (emphasizing that the fundamental function of rural land in
China was to offer peasants with basic income and a decent livelihood).
108. See generally Huang and Wang, supra note 81 (arguing that the government and courts should refrain
from intervening in the affairs of the village collective and only interfere when there is procedural impropriety
in the allocation of compensation); Tang, supra note 78 (suggesting reconciling national law with local rural
customs, rather than rigidly executing the national law); Wang, Legal Discourse of Good Governance, supra
note 81 (discussing the nature, function, and status of villagers’ charters from a historical perspective and
emphasizing the tradition of village autonomy in Chinese history); Wang, Establishing Systems of Legal
Protection, supra note 81 (arguing that MOW disputes were the result of traditional culture that discriminated
against women, the lack of government supervision over the village collective, the lack of a clear mechanism
to confirm rural collective membership, and the absence of civil remedies); Yang, supra note 98 (discussing
the marginalization of law in rural areas in China and the weakness of the regime in governing rural areas, as
well as emphasizing the need to strengthen the regime’s programme to improve farmers’ livelihood, reduce
their dependence on the village collective, and narrow the developmental gap between villages).
109. Gui, supra note 96 (observing that courts are not accepting MOW disputes as civil cases and arguing
that the administrative authorities, under the petition system, are in a better position to handle MOW disputes
because they have abundant resources and are usually more flexible in dealing with these kinds of matters).
110. Ling Zhu (朱玲), Nongdi Fenpei Zhong de Xingbie Pingdeng Wenti (农地分配中的性别平等问题)
(Gender Inequality in China’s Land Tenure System) JĪNGJÌ YÁNJIŪ ( 经 济 研 究 ) (ECON. RES. J.) 34 (2000)
(discovering, through extensive fieldwork, that marriage was the most common reason that causes rural
women to lose land, that rural women’s entitlement to land is determined primarily by the village collective,
and that the richer the village, the higher the likelihood that rural women will be allocated land rights).
111. See generally Jianyong Li (李建勇) & Liyuan Cao (曹力元), Jingji Shehui Bianqian Shiyu zhong de
Tudi Chengbao Jingyingquan Zhidu de Wanshan (经济社会变迁视阈中的土地承包经营权制度的完善)
[Improvement of the System for the Right of Land Contractual Operation in Changes of Economy and Society],
26 SHĀNXĪ GĀODĚNG XUÉXIÀO SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ XUÉBÀO (山西高等学校社会科学学报) (SOC. SCI. J. U.
SHANXI) 57 (2014) (arguing that the infringement of land rights was most severe when MOW married to
distant villages); Luo, Zheng, and Huang, supra note 76 (arguing that traditional culture, the lack of rights
consciousness and the failure of courts to enforce national laws were the main causes of rural women
landlessness in Fujian Province); Wenrong Qian (钱文荣) & Yingchun Mao (毛迎春), Zhongguo Nongcun
Funü Tudi Quanli Wenti de Shizheng Yanjiu (中国农村妇女土地权利问题的实证研究) (An Empirical Study
of Land Rights of Rural Women in China), 35 ZHÈJIĀNG DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (RÉNWÉN SHÈ KĒ BǍN) (浙江大学学
报(人文社科版)) (J. ZHEJIANG U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.)) 21 (2005) (arguing that rural women would easily
lose their land rights as a result of migration and marriage); Jingxin Wang (王景新), Zhongguo Nongcun Funü
Tudi Quanli: Yiyi, Xianzhuang, Qushi (中国农村妇女土地权利：意义、现状、趋势) (Land Rights of
Chinese Rural Women: Significance, Status and Trends) ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ ( 中国农村经济 )
(CHINESE RURAL ECON.) 25 (2003) (arguing that traditional culture and the lack of women’s participation in
social and political affairs in the rural community are the main causes of women’s disadvantageous position in
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to rural land entitlements and landlessness of rural women; 112 and (4) the
impact of villagers’ charters on rural women’s land rights.113
To date, no quantitative research has been conducted on MOW civil
lawsuits, a gap that this Article intends to fill.
C.

CHINA’S CEDAW OBLIGATIONS ON MARRIED-OUT WOMEN

China is under an obligation to protect the land rights of MOW (who are
considered “rural women”) under the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 114 China’s formal
dialogue with the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), which arises out of
China’s reporting obligation under CEDAW, did not produce any conclusive
evidence that MOW are being treated fairly and equally in the distribution of
government compensation following rural land expropriations. China
presented its Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report to the CEDAW
Committee (7/8 Reports) at the 59th Session of the CEDAW Committee in
Geneva in 2014.115 The 7/8 Reports are the latest reports submitted by China to
the United Nations.116 China reported that efforts have been made to properly

rural land ownership; also observing that while rural women were aware of their rights being infringed, they
rarely resort to legal remedies); Yawei Zhang ( 张 雅 维 ) et al., Shandong Sheng Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi
Diaocha Fenxi (山东省农村妇女土地权益调查分析) (An Investigation Analysis of Rural Women’s Land
Rights in Shandong) SHĀNDŌNG NǙZǏ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (山东女子大学学报) [J. SHANDONG WOMEN’S U.] 18
(2011) (arguing that most rural women would not take their land disputes to court, as most courts do not accept
these types of cases anyway).
112. See generally Chuanhao Tian ( 田 传 浩 ) & Jia Chen ( 陈 佳 ), Jingzhi Tudi Tiaozheng yu Funü Tudi
Quanli Baozhang: Jiyu Zhejiang he Shaanxi de Jingyan (禁止土地调整与妇女土地权利保障——基于浙江
和 陕 西 的 经 验 ) [The Prohibition of Rural Land Readjustment and the Protection of Women’s Land Rights:
Evidence from Zhejiang and Shaanxi Province], 12 JĪNGJÌ XUÉ (经济学) (CHINA ECON. Q.) 719 (2013)
(discussing how rural women lose land as a result of changing their residence, typically when they marry and
move to live with their husbands).
113. Senwei Huang ( 黄 森 慰 ) et al., Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi, Jiating Shouru yu Tudi Zhengce: Jiyu
Fujian Sheng Diaocha Shuju (农村妇女土地权益、家庭收入与土地政策——基于福建省调查数据) (Land
Rights of Rural Women, Incomes of Families and Land Policies: Based on Investigations into Fujian
Province), 22 ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (中国农业大学学报) (J. CHINA AGRIC. U.) 213, 216
(2017) (arguing that discrimination was not overwhelming—with 77.57% of respondents answering that there
was “[n]o such discriminating charter”—the villagers’ charters undermine the families’ economic status by
decreasing the area of farmland of those affected families).
114. G.A. Res. 34/180, at 15–16 (Dec. 18, 1979). See, in particular, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Rights of Rural Women, Arts. 14
and 15(2), CEDAW/C/GC/34 (Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 32]. Under the
General Recommendation on the Rights of Rural Women of the CEDAW Committee, which state parties must
follow, the following was highlighted: “[s]tates parties should ensure that legislation guarantees rural women’s
rights to land, water and other natural resources, on an equal basis with men, irrespective of their civil and
marital status or a male guardian/guarantor, and that they have full legal capacity.” General Recommendation
No. 32, at 17.
115. The session was held between October 20 and November 7, 2014.
116. China was due to submit its Ninth Report to the CEDAW Committee on November 1, 2018, but to
date no report has been submitted. See UN Treaty Body Database, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
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resolve the issue of land contract disputes involving rural women.117 China
pointed to a number of key statutes that provided protection to the rights of
women in rural land contracting and ensured that there is court access if such
rights are infringed.118 It was reported that various state organs carried out
special programs to ensure that the relevant statutory provisions that provide
protection to the rights of women in rural land contracting were enforced.119
Regarding the persistent problem of rural women being deprived of
compensation in rural land expropriation, the 7/8 Reports explained that
special efforts had been made to strengthen the regulation of the distribution
and use of the land acquisition compensation fees. 120 In its Concluding
Observations, the CEDAW Committee was still concerned that “a high
proportion of women in rural areas are still left without contracted land,”121
and called upon China to “eliminate all barriers which restrict women’s access
to land, particularly in rural areas, and ensure that the mediation and settlement
of such disputes afford women effective remedies.”122 China is due to report on
measures that it has taken to implement the above recommendations in the
upcoming reporting cycle.123
III. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND VARIABLES
A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In an effort to make the Chinese judiciary more transparent, many courts
in China now make their “documents of adjudication decisions”124 (DADs)
available to the public, and they are searchable online.125 This opens up an
invaluable research resource for empirical work on Chinese courts through
coding and analyzing the DADs.126 Using the China Judgments Online search
system, a search was conducted on March 21, 2018 for the purpose of the
OF THE COMM’R,

http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=CHN
&Lang=EN (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
117. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of State Parties: State Parties: State Parties: China,
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8 (Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter 7/8 Reports].
118. Id. at 3, 9 (referencing specifically the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and
Property Law).
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The next session of the Committee is the 75th Session (Feb. 10, 2020–Feb. 28, 2020, but China is not
on the agenda.
124. In Chinese: caipan wenshu (裁判文书).
125. This Article uses the China Judgments Online (http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/) search engine, which
holds one of the most comprehensive repositories of DADs online.
126. For previous empirical studies of DADs in China, see, e.g., He & Su, supra note 2; see also He and
Lin, supra note 55. While there is no system of stare decisis in China, DADs will slowly gain some normative
influence over subsequent cases as parties are now in a position to check whether their judge is deviating from
previous decisions.
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present study. In the search, the search terms “married-out women” (外嫁女)
and “Collective Economic Organization” (集体经济组织成员权益) were used
in a whole document search, and the search was limited to “judgments” (判决)
of “first-instance” ( 一 审 ) in “civil cases” ( 民 事 ) at “grassroots courts,” also
known as “basic-level courts” (基层法院). The search results contained 3579
DADs, which covers the time period between 2009 and 2017.127 Eighty-one
DADs were dropped for being duplicates. The resulting dataset contains 3498
DADs. To ensure the sample presents the same temporal and regional structure
of the population, the 3498 cases were assigned into different groups in
accordance with the year of the decision and the province where the court
belongs. The identified DADs were then randomly sampled. A sample of 1166
cases was selected, which is one-third of the population. After examining the
DADs, a codebook was created with a list of variables. Then, the information
from the DADs was hand-coded into a computer. Forty-four DADs were
dropped as they were unrelated to MOW’s land rights. A further 257 DADs
were dropped because the cases involved only the MOW’s spouses or children,
while the MOW themselves were not the claimants. An additional seven DADs
were dropped, of which two were duplicates, three contained no information
on the outcome of the case, and two were retrial cases, which were not within
the scope of this study because this study focuses only on first instance cases.
The final number for the DADs analysis was 858.128
The DADs analysis is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with
four informants who are judges and a legal practitioner with experience in
handling MOW disputes.129 The informants come from Jiangxi, Guangdong,
Shaanxi and Beijing. The selection provides diversity in regional variation and
professional experience.
B.

HOW DOES ONE DETERMINE WINNING AND LOSING?

The following metrics are adopted to determine whether the plaintiff
(MOW litigant) is winning through a complete win or partial win, or losing.

127. DADs from 2018 were dropped because the complete set of DADs for 2018 was unavailable at the
time of the search (March 21, 2018). The DADs prior to 2009 were also dropped because only two cases were
available online.
128. In some of the crosstabs analyses below, the chi-square test is not applicable due to the lack of
sufficient number of cases in each cell.
129. The informant from Jiangxi Province is a forty-one-year-old male judge who works at a basic-level
court in Jiangxi Province. The Author got in touch with this informant through a personal contact at the Higher
People’s Court of Jiangxi Province. This informant has experience in handling MOW lawsuits. The informant
from Guangdong Province is a thirty to forty-year-old female judge who works at a basic-level court in
Guangdong Province. She is a personal contact of the author, and she has some experience in handling MOW
disputes. The informant from Shaanxi Province is a female judge, approximately fifty years old, who works at
a basic-level court in Shaanxi Province. She is a personal contact of the author, and she has extensive
experience in handling MOW disputes. The informant from Beijing is a practicing thirty-eight-year-old male
lawyer. He runs a small firm in Beijing, which is well known in China for assisting MOW litigants. He is a
personal contact of the author.
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For monetary claims, a “complete win” means the plaintiff is awarded the
full amount claimed and the court confirms her status as member of the village
collective. Any of the following situations would be regarded as a “partial
win:” (1) plaintiff recovered the full amount of the monetary claim, but the
court does not confirm the plaintiff’s membership status; (2) plaintiff
recovered a partial amount of the monetary claim and the court confirms
plaintiff’s membership status; (3) plaintiff recovered a partial amount of the
monetary claim and the court does not confirm plaintiff’s membership status;
or (4) plaintiff is not awarded any monetary amount, but the court confirms the
plaintiff’s membership status. For monetary claims, only when the plaintiff is
not awarded any monetary amount and the court does not confirm the
plaintiff’s membership status would it be considered a “loss” for the plaintiff.
Non-monetary claims are actions requesting the court only to confirm the
plaintiff’s status as member of the village collective, without any claim for
monetary compensation relating to the land expropriation. If the court confirms
the plaintiff’s membership status, in which case the plaintiff’s Share of
Litigation Fees (SLF) is 0 percent, it is considered a “complete win.” If the
court did not confirm the plaintiff’s membership status, in which case the
plaintiff’s SLF is 100 percent, it is considered a “loss.” There will be no
“partial win” for non-monetary claims.
C.

INTRODUCTION TO THE VARIABLES

An analysis will be conducted to identify the variations of the MOW’s
success rates by a number of relevant independent variables: (1) party capacity;
(2) MOW’s connections with the villages; (3) legal representation; (4) law and
regulations of the state; (5) village internal rules; (6) previous dispute
resolution; and (7) procedural variables.
Party capacity encompasses variables such as the age, occupation, and
place of residence (either rural or urban) of the plaintiff, as well as the
institutional structure of the defendant and the number of defendants (single or
multiple). The role of lawyers in the variation of the outcome will be
examined.130 For a MOW to acquire membership status of the rural collective,
she must demonstrate connection with the village 131 Given the divergent
standards adopted by courts in determining “connection,” it would be
interesting to see how different types of “connections” play out in the
adjudication of MOW cases.132 While no national statute provided the test to

130. See, e.g., John Szmer et al., Does the Lawyer Matter: Influencing Outcomes on the Supreme Court of
Canada, 41 LAW & SOC. REV. 279, 298 (2007) (“Litigation team experience and size affect the Court’s
decisionmaking, even after controlling for several factors, including ideology and party capability.”).
131. Wen, supra note 107, at 20.
132. These connections that MOW litigants have with the natal village were selected because they
appeared repeatedly in the sampled DADs. These connections are likely to be considered relevant in the
court’s determination of membership status of the MOW.
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determine village collective membership,133 a plethora of national laws either
directly or indirectly protect the land rights of the MOW.134 Provincial judicial
rules that favor MOW rights were believed to be an important factor in shaping
the attitude of lower courts.135 It is also valuable to understand how courts
interpret village internal rules (villagers’ charters) and the resulting variation of
the outcome.136 Furthermore, the data will also allow one to determine whether
previous court decisions, administrative rulings, and citizens’ petitions are
significant in the variation of the outcome. Procedural variables—like trial in
absentia and burden of proof—will also be applied.
IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: THE “HAVE-NOTS” CAME OUT AHEAD
A. OVERVIEW
1.

Temporal Variations

Temporal variations are explored as part of the overview of the data.137 In
terms of the MOW’s success rates by the year of the court decision, 2015 had
the highest rate of frequency, and 2009 had the lowest rate of frequency. Using
the losing rate as the benchmark, it appears that an upward trend can be
identified during the period between 2012 and 2016.138 Looking at the rate of
frequency, there was an explosion of lawsuits from 2014 to 2016.139 The high
losing rate coincided with the explosion of lawsuits between 2014 and 2016.140

133. See supra text accompanying notes 22–26.
134. See supra text accompanying note 18.
135. Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen Anjian de Huiyi Jiyao (关于审理农
村集体经济组织收益分配纠纷案件的会议纪要) (Minutes of a Meeting about Adjudicating Cases of
Disputes on Allocation of Rural Economic Collective Incomes) (promulgated by the High Ct. Chongqing
Municipality, May 31, 2009, effective May 31, 2009) (Westlaw China).
136. The villagers’ charter is the “internal constitution” of the village community and is usually
unpublished. Villagers’ charters in many rural communities violate state law. A common criticism of villagers’
charters is that they are being used as a tool to control villagers, instead of being used to instill the core values
of the village community and protect the rights of its members. In many cases, the villagers’ charter was used
as a ground to defeat MOW’s claims in court. How courts interpret these laws and villagers’ charters—and
whether the outcome is significantly varied by the interpretation—are important information that helps an
individual better read the MOW issue.
137. See infra Table 1.
138. The MOW litigants’ losing rate first increased in 2013 (from 0% in 2012 to 3.03% in 2013). The
losing rate continued to spike in 2014 (6.50%), came down slightly in 2015 (6.33%), and then shot up again in
2016 (10.80%). The interesting phenomenon is that the losing rate came down drastically in 2017 (1.23%).
139. In 2013, there were only thirty-three cases nationwide (3.85%). In 2014, the frequency skyrocketed to
200 cases (23.31%). It stayed at this elevated level during 2015 (221 cases, 25.76%) and 2016 (213 cases,
24.83%), until it dropped to 162 cases (18.88%) in 2017.
140. The explosion in the number of lawsuits suggests that the volume of MOW disputes skyrocketed
during this period. One possible explanation is that, when more people sued, it encouraged others with less
meritorious claims to bring lawsuits as well.
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TABLE 1: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE YEAR OF COURT DECISION
Year of decisions
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009

2.

Frequency
18.88%
24.83%
25.76%
23.31%
3.85%
1.75%
0.82%
0.70%
0.12%

Complete win
85.80%
75.59%
76.47%
70.00%
75.76%
80.00%
85.71%
66.67%
0.00%

Partial win
12.96%
13.62%
17.19%
23.50%
21.21%
20.00%
14.29%
33.33%
100.00%

Loss
1.23%
10.80%
6.33%
6.50%
3.03%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Regional Variations

Mapping MOW litigants’ success rates across provinces may reveal
interesting patterns. Courts in each province may adopt different approaches to
MOW cases due to policy or case management reasons. Local rules and the
policies of provincial high courts on MOW disputes may also differ.141 The
divergence in economic development may also affect how courts in different
provinces treat MOW cases.
Hunan had the highest rate of frequency during the period of 2009–2017,
while Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Liaoning had the lowest rate of frequency.142
The provinces with the lowest losing rates were Chongqing, Gansu, Inner
Mongolia, Hebei, Jiangsu and Liaoning. 143 The province with the highest
losing rate was Shanxi.144

141. For instance, a policy document issued by the Shaanxi Provincial High Court made it clear that the
MOW would lose their membership status in their natal village collective if: (1) the litigant’s actual residence
was not in the village; (2) the litigant’s primary source of income was not from the village; or (3) the litigant
failed to make contributions to the village. See Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen
Anjian Taolunhui Jiyao (关于审理农村集体经济组织收益分配纠纷案件讨论会纪要) (Minutes of a Session
about Adjudicating Cases of Disputes on Allocation of Rural Economic Collective Incomes) (promulgated by
the High Ct. Shaanxi Province, Jan. 6, 2006, effective Feb. 1, 2006) (Westlaw China). These disqualification
provisions are not found in the policy document issued by the Anhui Provincial High Court. See Guanyu Chuli
Nongcun Tudi Jiufen Anjian De Zhidao Yijian (关于处理农村土地纠纷案件的指导意见) (Guideline about
Handling Disputes on Rural Land) (promulgated by the High Ct. Anhui Province, Dec. 27, 2004, effective Jan.
1, 2005) (Westlaw China).
142. See infra Table 2.
143. Hebei, Jiangsu, and Liaoning also have the lowest rate of frequency (0.12%). See infra Table 2.
144. But note that Shanxi has the second lowest rate of frequency (0.23%). See infra Table 2.
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TABLE 2: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES ACROSS PROVINCES (N=858)
Province
Frequency Complete win Partial win Loss
GDP/Capita (unit: RMB)
Jiangsu (96887)
0.12%
Zhejiang (84916)
7.11%
Fujian (74707)
12.59%
Guangdong (74016)
15.62%
Inner Mongolian (72064) 0.35%
Chongqing (58502)
1.17%
Shaanxi (51015)
5.48%
Liaoning (50791)
0.12%
Hunan (46382)
35.08%
Hainan (44347)
15.97%
Hebei (43062)
0.12%
Henan (42575)
0.58%
Jiangxi (40400)
0.12%
Sichuan (40003)
0.47%
Anhui (39561)
1.40%
Guangxi (38027)
3.26%
Shanxi (35532)
0.23%
Gansu (27643)
0.23%

100.00%
57.38%
70.37%
72.39%
66.67%
70.00%
65.96%
100.00%
81.40%
89.78%
100.00%
40.00%
0.00%
50.00%
66.67%
85.71%
0.00%
50.00%

0.00%
32.79%
17.59%
25.37%
33.33%
30.00%
19.15%
0.00%
16.28%
6.57%
0.00%
40.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
3.57%
0.00%
50.00%

0.00%
9.84%
12.04%
2.24%
0.00%
0.00%
14.89%
0.00%
2.33%
3.65%
0.00%
20.00%
0.00%
50.00%
33.33%
10.71%
100.00%
0.00%

Economic Factors: MOW’s Success Rates Across Four GDP Per
Capita Clusters
To measure the variation across provinces of similar economic strength in
terms of GDP per capita, 145 the provinces are assigned into four different
“GDP Per Capita Clusters.”146
3.

145. The latest official GDP per capita data of provinces available in China run up to 2016. See National
Data,
NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
STATISTICS
OF
CHINA
(last
visited
Nov.
6,
2019)
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103.
146. The four clusters are: (a) not less than RMB20000, but less than RMB40000 per capita; (b) not less
than RMB40000, but less than RMB60000 per capita; (c) not less than RMB60000, but less than RMB80000
per capita; and (d) not less than RMB80000, but less than RMB100000 per capita.
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TABLE 3: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY GDP CLUSTERS
(N=858)
GDP per capita*

Frequency

Complete win Partial win Loss

7.23%
28.55%
58.86%
5.36%

58.06%
71.43%
81.39%
73.91%

(Unit: RMB1000)
[80, 100)
[60, 80)
[40, 60)
[20, 40)

32.26%
22.04%
14.26%
6.52%

9.68%
6.53%
4.36%
19.57%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=39.460, *P=0.000(<0.01).

From the data,147 it can be concluded that the region with the weakest
economic development (GDP Per Capita Cluster (RMB20000–40000)) is least
favorable to MOW litigants because it has the highest losing rate.148
While one may expect that the more economically developed the region
is, the lower the losing rate would be,149 we find that the cluster with the
highest GDP per capita value (GDP Per Capita Cluster (RMB80000–100000))
is second least favorable to MOW litigants (with the second highest losing
rate). A possible explanation from an economic perspective is that
economically developed regions provide more non-agricultural work
opportunities and, as such, the value of the rural land (and/or its derivative
interests) was comparatively less significant in sustaining the MOW’s
livelihood. On this basis, the court may find less connection between the
MOW and their natal village.150
The MOW litigant’s success rates varied significantly across the different
GDP Per Capita Clusters (chi-square=39.460, P=0.000).
B.

THE “HAVE-NOTS” CAME OUT AHEAD
1.

MOW Litigants (“Have-Nots”) Are Winning By a Substantial
Margin

The findings show that MOW litigants are winning by a substantial
margin.151 Out of the 858 sampled cases, the MOW litigants won 93.90% of
the time, combining “complete win” (76.50%) and “partial win” (17.40%). The
MOW litigant only lost 6.20% of the time.

147. See supra Table 3.
148. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that, in poorer regions, there is less awareness for
protecting women’s rights, and women are generally less educated and usually occupy a weaker position in
society vis-à-vis their counterparts in more developed regions. For these reasons, courts in poorer regions may
see less of an obligation to enforce MOW property rights.
149. The proposition would be that MOW litigants in economically advanced regions tend to be more
educated, resourceful, and rights conscious.
150. Zhu, supra note 110, at 38.
151. See infra Table 4.
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TABLE 4: GENERAL INFORMATION ON OUTCOME FOR THE MOW
Frequency Percent
Outcome Frequency Percent Cumulative Rate of
Recovery of
Percent
Monetary
76.50% 76.50%
Complete 656
Claim
win
656
77.63%
100%
Partial 149
17.40% 93.90%
62
7.34%
(75%, 100%)
win
53
6.20% 100%
Loss
28
3.31%
(50%, 75%]
Total
858
100%
23
2.72%
(25%, 50%]

2.

(0%, 25%]

10

1.18%

0%

66

7.81%

Total

845

100%

Monetary Claims: Recovery Rate, Average Claim, and Average
Award

The rate of recovery by the MOW litigants in monetary claims, excluding
non-monetary claims, (n=845) are on the high side, with 77.63% of the MOW
litigants recovering the full amount (recovered 100%) of their claims.152
The data shows (n=845) that the mean and median values of the average
monetary claim are RMB55509.09 and RMB22745.95, respectively, with
standard deviation at RMB110682.73.153 The data shows the mean and median
values of the average monetary award are RMB48643.65 and RMB17500.00,
respectively, with standard deviation at RMB108310.58. The data shows the
mean and median values of the recovery rates of monetary claims are 0.8784
and 1, respectively, with standard deviation at 0.2946.

152. See supra Table 4.
153. See infra Table 5.
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TABLE 5: STATISTICS ON MONETARY CLAIMS
(N=845)

Average monetary claim
Average monetary award
Recover rate

3.

Mean

Median

SD

55509.09

22745.95

110682.73

48643.65

17500.00

108310.58

0.8784

1

0.2946

Judicial Confirmation of the MOW’s Village Collective Membership
Status

From the data (n=849), the court confirmed the MOW’s membership
status 92.46% of the time. In 3.77% of the cases, the court denied the MOW’s
membership status.154 For cases that confirmed the MOW’s membership status,
83.31% were complete wins, and 16.69% were partial wins. By definition, no
MOW litigant had lost under this situation. This is contrasted with the
substantially lower success rate in cases where the court denied the MOW’s
membership status: 0% (complete win), 6.25% (partial win), and 93.75%
(loss).
For cases where the court deferred the decision of membership status to
the village collective, the MOW partially won 60% of the time and lost 40% of
the time. This seems paradoxical at first glance, as confirming membership
status seems to be a consistent basis for courts awarding compensation. The
high partial win rate means that the court awarded monetary compensation to
the MOW litigants despite deferring the question of membership status to the
village collective. From reviewing the reasoning in the DADs in this category,
the court had in fact impliedly accepted the MOW’s membership status, but it
was not prepared to formally confirm the MOW’s membership status, stating
that such power was vested in the village collective.155

154. See infra Table 6.
155. For a particular case that illustrates this, see Yuangao Zhang Lihui Su Beigao Changsha Shi Yuhua
Qu Tiaoma Zhen Xiyu Cun Zhangjiawan Cunmin Xiaozu Yi Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen
(原告张利辉诉被告长沙市雨花区跳马镇喜雨村张家湾村民小组以侵 害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷)
[Zhang Lihui v. Zhangjiawan Grp., Xiyu Village, Tiaoma Town, Yuhua Dist., Changsha City on Infringing
Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Changsha Yuhua Dist. People’s Ct. June 13, 2016)
(China).
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TABLE 6: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE COURT’S DECISION ON MOW’S
MEMBERSHIP STATUS (N=849)
Decision on MOW’s
Membership Status

Frequency

Complete
win

Partial win

Loss

Confirmed membership
status

92.46%

83.31%

16.69%

0.00%

Denied membership status

3.77%

0.00%

6.25%

93.75%

Deferred to the village
collective

2.36%

0.00%

60.00%

40.00%

Remained silent on the
issue

1.06%

0.00%

0.00%

100.00%

Declined to make any
decision

0.35%

0.00%

100.00%

0.00%

4.

Whether “Village Autonomy” Was Mentioned in the Court Decision

In adjudicating MOW lawsuits, the court may need to balance the
interests of the MOW and the village collective.156 Courts that are inclined to
respect “village autonomy” are usually more reluctant to apply national laws
that favor the MOW and overturn decisions already made by the village
collective.157 This hypothesis will be tested with the data.

156. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Female, Judge, Shaanxi Province Basic-Level Court (Jan. 9,
2019) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province]. Courts in China frequently
find themselves in a position of needing to consider the social impact of their decisions, especially for cases
that could potentially upset the stability of the local community. Id. Court mediation is used by Chinese courts
as a way to pacify the parties and alleviate the harshness of the zero-sum nature of litigation. Id. See generally
PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A PROCEDURALIST DIACHRONIC
PERSPECTIVE (2017) (analyzing the social agenda in Chinese civil adjudication).
157. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156; see also supra note
129. For a case example of courts that have an inclination of respecting “village autonomy” that are usually
more reluctant to apply national laws that favor the MOW, see Zheng Shaolu Yu Jinhua Shi Jindong Qu
Xiaoshun Zhen Shitatou Cun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen Yishen
Minshi Panjueshu (郑少路与金华市金东区孝顺镇石塔头村村民委员会侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷
一 审 民 事 判 决 书 ) [Zheng Shaolu v. Villager Comm. of Shitatou Village, Xiaoshun Town, Jindong Dist.,
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From the data (n=858), 90.68% of the cases did not mention “village
autonomy” at all. Only 9.32% of the cases referred to “village autonomy.”158
The MOW’s losing rate was much higher when the court mentioned “village
autonomy.” Whether “village autonomy” was mentioned in the court decision
significantly affected the variation of the outcome (chi-square=38.019,
p=0.000).159
TABLE 7: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY (1) WHETHER “VILLAGE AUTONOMY”
WAS MENTIONED IN THE COURT DECISION; AND (2) WHETHER THE MOW HAD
PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO THE COMPENSATION DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENT
UNDER THE VILLAGERS’ CHARTER OR ALLOCATION AGREEMENT
Village autonomy (n=858) *

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

No

90.68%

79.05%

16.07%

4.88%

Yes

9.32%

51.25%

30.00%

18.75%

35.71%

70.00%

10.00%

20.00%

64.29%

38.89%

16.67%

44.44%

Whether the MOW agreed to
the distribution arrangement
under Villagers’ Charter or
Allocation Agreement (n=28)
No
Yes
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=38.019, P=0.000 (<0.01).

C.

CAPACITY OF THE PLAINTIFF (MOW LITIGANT)

1. Age Groups
Four hundred and twenty-eight cases contained valid information on the
age groups of the MOW.160 The age group from fifty to fifty-nine-years-old
has the highest losing rate (8%), while the age group from sixty to sixty-nineyears-old and age group from seventy to seventy-nine-years-old have the
lowest losing rates (0%). From the available data, it can be observed that the
Jinhua City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Jinhua Jindong Dist. People’s
Ct. Dec. 12, 2014) (China).
158. See infra Table 7. Out of those cases that mentioned “village autonomy”, the MOW litigants’ success
rates were: 51.25% (complete win), 30% (partial win) and 18.75% (loss). Out of those cases that did not
mention “village autonomy,” the MOW litigants’ success rates were: 79.05% (complete win), 16.07% (partial
win), and 4.88% (loss).
159. See infra Table 7.
160. See infra Table 8a. For cases where there are multiple plaintiffs, the first plaintiff’s age is recorded.
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plaintiffs are predominantly from the younger generation (thirty to thirty-nineyears-old age group, with the rate of frequency of 65.89%). Very rarely would
the plaintiff come from an older generation.161
TABLE 8A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE AGE GROUPS OF MOW
(N=428)
Age of MOW Frequency

Complete win

Partial win

Loss

30-39

65.89%

77.30%

16.31%

6.38%

40-49

27.10%

72.41%

20.69%

6.90%

50-59

5.84%

76.00%

16.00%

8.00%

60-69

0.93%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

70-79

0.24%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

2.

Number of Plaintiffs in the Case

TABLE 8B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY SINGLE OR MULTIPLE PLAINTIFF(S)
(MOW) (N=858)
Single or multiple*

Total

Complete win

Partial win

Loss

Single

71.33%

77.45%

15.69%

6.86%

Multiple

28.67%

73.98%

21.54%

4.47%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=5.368, P=0.068.

Cases with a single plaintiff have a higher frequency than multiple
plaintiffs, 162 which appears to confirm the reluctance of Chinese courts to
entertain multi-plaintiff litigations.163

161. MOW litigants, age thirty to age thirty-nine, have the highest frequency (65.89%). There are two
possible reasons for this: first, MOW disputes arise from the rural women marrying out of the village and,
second, as compared to older age groups, age thirty to age thirty-nine are more likely to get married (although,
interestingly, the sample did not have any plaintiff younger than thirty).
162. See supra Table 8b.
163. Robin Hui Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-Year Retrospective and
Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 793 (2013).
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Plaintiff’s Place of Residence at the Time of the Lawsuit

Eight hundred fifty-eight cases contained valid information on the
plaintiff’s place of residence at the time of the lawsuit,164 such as whether the
MOW litigant resides in a rural or urban neighborhood.165
In the data, plaintiffs residing in a rural neighborhood have a higher
“losing rate” (7.85%) than plaintiffs residing in an urban neighborhood
(6.25%). The data shows the plaintiff’s place of residence presented no
significance in the variations of the outcome (chi-square=3.288, p=0.193).
TABLE 8C: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY PLAINTIFF’S PLACE OF RESIDENCE (AT
THE TIME OF THE LAWSUIT) AND OCCUPATION
Frequency

Loss

Current
residency*
(n=857)

Rural

90.67%

Complete
win
76.58%

Partial
win
16.86%

6.56%

Urban

9.33%

75.00%

22.50%

2.50%

Occupation
(n=65)

Peasant

72.31%

72.34%

21.28%

6.38%

Migrant
worker

3.08%

50.00%

50.00%

0.00%

Private
business

15.38%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Unemployed

9.23%

83.33%

16.67%

0.00%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=3.288, (P=0.193).

4.

Categories of the Plaintiff

In sixty-five cases,166 there contained valid information on the plaintiff’s
categories.167 Peasants have the highest losing rate (6.38%),168 while the other
three categories—migrant workers, 169 private business owners, and
unemployed—are tied with the lowest losing rates (each at 0%).

164. See infra Table 8c.
165. Jize Jiang & Kai Kuang, Hukou Status and Sentencing in the Wake of Internal Migration: The
Penalty Effect of Being Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China, 40 LAW & POL’Y 196, 197 (2018).
166. See supra Table 8c.
167. For cases with multiple plaintiffs, the first plaintiff’s occupation is recorded.
168. In He and Su’s study, farmers also had the highest losing rate when matched against the government.
He & Su, supra note 2, at 131. But one must look at this within the statistical context. In He and Su’s study,
farmers lost 100%of all cases; here, the “peasants” only lost 6.38%. Id; see supra Table 8c.
169. See Jiang & Kuang, supra note 165 (explaining the disparate legal treatment experienced by migrants
in China).
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The overwhelming majority of plaintiffs resided in a rural neighborhood
at the time of the lawsuit (90.67%), which suggests that the MOW issue is a
deeply rural issue, with most MOW marrying into other villages as opposed to
moving into the cities. It is interesting to note that plaintiffs who were nonpeasants did not lose a single case.
D. CAPACITY OF THE DEFENDANT (VILLAGE COLLECTIVE)
1.

Single or Multiple Defendant(s)

Most cases had single defendants (82.87%), with only 17.13% of cases
having multiple defendants.170 The success rates of the MOW litigants are
close in both situations. The data shows there are no significant variations of
the outcome across the number of defendants in the case (chi-square=0.339,
p=0.844).
TABLE 9A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY SINGLE OR MULTIPLE DEFENDANT(S)
(N=858)
Number of the
defendant(s)*
Single

Total

Complete win

Partial win

Loss

82.87%

76.09%

17.58%

6.33%

Multiple

17.13%

78.23%

16.33%

5.44%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=0.339, P=0.844.

170. See infra Table 9a.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

36

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

2.

[Vol. 71:1

Institutional Nature of the Defendant

TABLE 9B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT
(N=857)
The principal defendant*

Frequency

Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

Villagers’ Committee

11.55%

68.69%

18.18%

13.13%

Villagers’ Group

70.48 %

77.98%

15.89%

6.13%

7.58%

78.46%

20.00%

1.54%

1.40%

91.67%

0.00%

8.33%

8.05%

72.46%

26.09%

1.45%

0.23%

0.00%

100.00%

0.00%

0.35%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.35%

66.67%

33.33%

0.00%

Shareholding Economic
Cooperative of the Village
(股份经济合作社)
Neighborhood Community
(居委会)
Residents’ Group
(居民小組)
Villagers’ Economic Union
(经济联合社)
Farm Production Team
(农场生产队)
Others

The MOW litigants lose more when they are up against the villagers’
committees (13.13%),171 when compared to the villagers’ groups (6.13%).172

171. See supra Table 9b.
172. The villagers’ committee will only be named the principal defendant when it is in charge of the
compensation allocation, which would only occur when the village group is unable to handle the allocation
(for example, if it is unable to elect a leader to supervise the allocation process). Compared to the village
group, the villagers’ committee is usually less connected to the immediate interests behind the allocation. It
follows that the villagers’ committee is more impartial than the village group, which explains why it is harder
to challenge the villagers’ committee’s decision in court.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2019]

E.

RURAL LAND DISPUTES

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

37

MOW’S CONNECTION WITH THE NATAL VILLAGE

From the data compiled in Table 10, with the exception of two
“connection variables” (growing up in the village and possession of share
certificate), 173 all other connections with the natal villages helped MOW’s
cases.174 For example, the data reinforces the view that household registration
(hukou)175 is critical in the determination of membership status of the MOW.176
The same goes for social and medical insurance of the village collectives,
which generally only cover individuals who are members of the collective.177
Some courts also consider the birthplace of the MOW as a relevant factor in
determining membership statuses.178 According to common practice,179 if the
MOW were born in the village and one of their parents was a member, they
would have acquired membership automatically at birth.180 The data shows that
the MOW litigant’s success rate varied significantly by the MOW contracting
land in the village (chi-square=27.186, p=0.000).181 The higher success rate for
MOW litigants who had contracted land suggests that the productive use of
village land by the MOW is a key factor that courts take into account.182
For MOW litigants with existing land rights in the village, the court
considers it a relevant factor if the MOW litigants rely on such rights as their
primary source of income, whether they exercise such rights by way of
engaging in agricultural activities, or receiving rental income if the land is
rented out. Here, it seems the court makes an effort to protect MOW who are
173. For village collectives that maintain “shareholding cooperatives,” the possession of a share certificate
is considered a negative factor for the court in determining membership.
174. See infra Table 10.
175. Almost all provincial regulations require MOW’s household registration to be at the natal village as a
prerequisite for attaining membership status.
176. The enormous jump in the losing rate when MOW’s household registrations were not in the villages
suggests that household registration tends to be a key factor that could sway the court’s decision. This is
understandable, as the legal basis of MOW’s property rights stem from their status as members of the village
collective, which can be (at least partly) reflected by their household registrations being in the villages. Only in
very rare cases would the court award compensation to MOW who had moved their household registrations
elsewhere.
177. From the court’s perspective, confirmation that MOW are covered under the collectives’ social and
medical insurance helps establish the membership status of MOW.
178. Liu Mou Su Wangcheng Mou Shequ Qinfan Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (刘某诉
望城某社区侵犯集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Liu X v. X Cmty., Wangcheng Dist. on Infringing Rights
and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Wangcheng Dist. People’s Ct. Feb. 2, 2010) (China).
179. See, e.g., Lü Meifang Su Nanning Shi Wuming Qu Chengxiang Zhen Datong Cun Di’er Cunmin
Xiaozu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (吕梅芳诉南宁市武鸣区城厢镇大同村第二村
民小组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Lü Meifang v. Second Grp., Datong Village, Chengxiang Town,
Wuming Dist., Nanning City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Nanning
Wuming Dist. People’s Ct. Aug. 29, 2017) (China).
180. In Chinese, yuanshi qude (原始取得).
181. See infra Table 10.
182. See, e.g., Peng Lili Su Yongxing Xian Chengguan Zhen Tongjiaowan Cun Pengjia Cunmin Xiaozu
Qinfan Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (彭丽丽诉永兴县城关镇铜角湾村彭家村民小组侵犯
集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Peng Lili v. Peng’s Villager Grp., Tongjiaowan Village, Chengguan Town,
Yongxing Cty. on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Yongxing Cty. People’s
Ct. Jan. 12, 2010) (China).
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financially dependent on their land rights in the village,183 which is borne out
in the data.
Courts sometimes consider making contributions to the village as a sign
of close connectedness with the village.184 MOW would sometimes volunteer
to patrol the village and to help repair ancestral worship sites.
MOW’s actual residences in their natal villages is sometimes used by the
court to establish connectedness to the village. In some provinces, actual
residency is even considered a prerequisite to obtaining membership status.185
If the MOW are already enjoying land rights in their husbands’ village
collective, the court has a tendency to invalidate the MOW’s membership in
their natal village to avoid double-vesting of land entitlement. This view is
borne out in the data.186
TABLE 10: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY HER CONNECTION(S) WITH THE
VILLAGE
Connections

Frequency Complete win Partial win

Loss

Yes

98.70%

77.76%

16.32%

5.92%

No

1.30%

20.0%

10.0%

70.0%

Born in the village Yes
(n=562)
No

98.22%

78.26%

16.85%

4.89%

1.78%

80.00%

10.00%

10.00%

Growing up in the Yes
village
(n=104)
No

97.12%

87.13%

10.89%

1.98%

2.88%

66.67%

33.33%

0.00%

Actual residence
(n=252)

Yes

74.60%

81.91%

17.02%

1.06%

No

25.40%

35.94%

20.31%

43.75%

94.31%

79.31%

13.36%

7.33%

5.69%

28.57%

7.14%

64.29%

Household
registration
(n=770)

Social or medical Yes
insurance (n=246)
No

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See He, supra note 23, at 210 (explaining that actual residence was a “precondition to enjoying the
dividends and other benefits”).
186. See infra Table 10.
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Primary source of Yes
income (n=312)
No

96.15%

88.33%

11.33%

0.33%

3.85%

0.00%

25.00%

75.00%

Yes

91.14%

83.33%

13.89%

2.78%

No

8.86%

50.00%

28.57%

21.43%

Yes

76.19%

75.00%

25.00%

0.00%

No

23.81%

20.00%

10.00%

70.00%

Share certificates Yes
and others (n=60)
No

96.67%

65.52%

32.76%

1.72%

3.33%

50.00%

50.00%

0.00%

Enjoy land rights Yes
in husband’s
village
Not
(n=286)

1.06%

33.33%

0.00%

66.67%

98.95%

81.63%

12.72%

5.65%

Contracted land
(n=316) *
Obligations or
contributions
(n=42)

39

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=27.186, P=0.000 (<0.01).

F.

LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PARTIES
1.

Legal Representation of the Plaintiff

Seven hundred eighty cases contained valid information on whether the
plaintiff had legal representation. 187 The data shows that MOW litigants’
success rates varied significantly by legal representation of the plaintiff (chisquare=5.658, p=0.059). Interestingly, MOW litigants without legal
representation had a higher success rate.

187. See infra Table 11a.
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TABLE 11A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF EACH
PARTY
Legal Rep.

Frequenc Complet Partial
y
e win
win

Loss

Chi-square

Yes
Plaintiff
(MOW)
No
(n=780)
Defendant
Yes
(VC) (n=761)
No

77.69%

76.90%

7.10%

5.658*
P=0.059

22.31%
30.49%

76.44% 20.69% 2.87%
65.95% 21.98% 12.07% 33.206***
P=0.000
83.36% 13.04% 3.59%

69.51%

16.01%

*NOTE: *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01

2.

Legal Representation of the Defendant

Seven hundred sixty-one cases contained valid information on whether
the defendant, village collective (VC), had legal representation.188
The data show that MOW litigants had a higher rate of success when the
defendant had no legal representation, meaning a represented defendant has a
higher success rate. The data shows that MOW litigants’ success rate varied
significantly by the legal representation of the defendant (chi-square=33.206,
p=0.000).
3.

Legal Representation of Both Parties (in Four Different
Configurations)
The data shows (n=719) that 4.31% were cases where the defendant had
legal representation, but the plaintiff had no legal representation.189 The MOW
litigants’ success rates were: 74.19% (complete win); 22.58% (partial win);
and 3.23% (loss). In 16.41% of the cases, neither party had legal
representation. The MOW litigant success rates were: 83.05% (complete win);
14.41% (partial win); and 2.54% (loss).
In 52.71% of the cases, the plaintiff had legal representation, but the
defendant had no legal representation. The MOW litigants’ success rates were:
82.85% (complete win); 12.93% (partial win); and 4.22% (loss). In 26.56% of
the cases, both parties had legal representation. The MOW litigants’ success
rates were: 65.45% (complete win); 20.42% (partial win); and 14.14% (loss).
The data shows that, when the plaintiff had legal representation, whether or not
the defendant had legal representation was significant for the MOW litigants’
success rates (chi-square=26.158, P=0.000).

188. See infra Table 11a.
189. See infra Table 11b.
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TABLE 11B: LEGAL REPRESENTATION (LR): LR OF PLAINTIFF (MOW) VS. LR
OF DEFENDANT (VC) (N=719)
Plaintiff’s
LR

Total

Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

4.31%

74.19%

22.58%

3.23%

16.41%

83.05%

14.41%

2.54%

Total

20.72%

81.21%

16.11%

2.68%

Defendant’s LR Yes

26.56%

65.45%

20.42%

14.14%

52.71%

82.85%

12.93%

4.22%

79.28%

77.02%

15.44%

7.54%

Defendant’s LR Yes

No

No

Yes*

No
Total

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=26.158, P=0.000 (TWO-SIDED).

4.

Type of Legal Representation

When the plaintiff was represented by a professional attorney from a law
firm, 190 the MOW litigants’ success rate—combining complete and partial
winning rates—varied with the different types of representation for the
defendant: 95.86% (defendant has no legal representation); 85.72% (defendant
represented by a professional attorney); and 100% (defendant represented by
basic-level legal service).
The data reveals that when the plaintiff retained basic-level legal
service,191 the MOW litigants’ success rate—combining complete and partial
winning rates—varies with the different types of representation for the
defendant: 95.06% (defendant has no legal representation); 71.11% (defendant
represented by professional attorney); 100% (defendant represented by basiclevel legal service).
The two sets of data above show, collectively, that whenever the
defendant is represented by a professional attorney, MOW litigants’ success
rates drops.

190. See infra Table 11a.
191. See infra Table 11a.
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TABLE 11C: LEGAL REPRESENTATION (LR): LR OF PLAINTIFF VS. LR OF
DEFENDANT (VC) BY THE TYPE OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION (N=719)
LR of Plaintiff
No LR

LR of
No legal
Defendant representative

Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
16.41%
83.05% 14.41% 2.54%

Professional
attorney

3.34%

75.00% 20.83% 4.17%

Basic-level
legal service

0.97%

71.43% 28.57% 0.00%

20.72%

81.21% 16.11% 2.68%

0.42%

100.00%

–b

–b

0.42%

100.00%

–b

–b

40.33%

83.79% 12.07% 4.14%

13.63%

64.29% 21.43% 14.29%

4.31%

77.42% 22.58% 0.00%

58.72%

78.76% 15.04% 6.21%

1.25%

100.00%

–b

–b

1.25%

100.00%

–b

–b

11.27%

76.54% 18.52% 4.94%

6.26%

53.33% 17.78% 28.89%

Total
Professional
Staff from LR of
legal
Defendant attorney
organization
a

Total
No legal
Professional LR of
attorney
Defendant representative
from law
firm
Professional
attorney
Basic-level
legal service
Total
Professional LR of
government
attorney a
Total

No legal
representative

No legal
Basic-level LR of
legal service Defendant representative
Professional
attorney
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1.67%

83.33% 16.67% 0.00%

Total

19.20%

69.57% 18.12% 12.32%

LR of the Professional
Defendant attorney

0.14%

100.00%

–b

–b

Total

0.14%

100.00%

–b

–b

*NOTE: ASTATISTICS WERE NOT COMPUTED BECAUSE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE VILLAGE
AND THE OUTCOMES OF CASES ARE CONSTANTS. BCANNOT BE OBTAINED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT
NUMBER OF CASES IN THE CELL.

Legal Representation of the Parties, MOW’s Connection with the
Village, and MOW Litigants’ Success Rates: A Three-Way Crosstabs
Analysis
In the bivariate analysis above, 192 which shows that MOW litigants’
success rates varied significantly by legal representation of the plaintiff (chisquare=5.658, p=0.059), it was found that MOW litigants without legal
representation had a higher rates of success.193 However, the bivariate analysis
may not give a complete picture since some of the explanatory variables are
correlated. For example, is it possible that the plaintiffs who won without legal
representation had stronger connection with the village? In order to test this, it
is necessary to include a “connection with village” variable (connection
variable) to control and perform a three-way crosstabs analysis.194
From this analysis, when MOW’s household registrations were in the
villages, legal representation of the MOW is significant in the variation of the
outcome (chi-square=5.349, P=0.069). 195 When MOW’s household
registrations were in the village, MOW without legal representation have a
lower losing rate (3.45%) than those with legal representation (6.56%).
When MOW were covered by the villages’ social or medical insurance,
legal representation of the MOW is significant in the variation of MOW
litigants’ success rates (chi-square=5.149, P=0.076). 196 When MOW were
5.

192. See supra Table 11a.
193. The losing rate of the plaintiff was higher when she had legal representation (7.10%). The losing rate
of the plaintiff was 2.87%when she had no legal representation.
194. A three-way cross-tabulation analysis compares the results of three variables and presents their
interrelations. See STUART MACDONALD & NICOLA HEADLAM, RESEARCH METHODS HANDBOOK:
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO RESEARCH METHODS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 28 (2008). In the MOW context, while
the bivariate analysis shows that MOW litigants without legal representation have a higher success rate, it may
not give a complete picture since some of the explanatory variables are correlated. It is possible that the
winning cases without legal representation have a stronger (or closer) connection with the village. By
introducing a third variable (the connection variable) as control (such as by performing the three-way crosstabulation analysis), a more complete picture can be presented.
195. See infra Table 12a.
196. See infra Table 12e.
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covered by the villages’ social or medical insurance, MOW without legal
representation have a higher losing rate (11.11%) than those with legal
representation (6.01%). For all other connection variables, legal representation
of MOW is insignificant in the variation of the outcome.197
The above three-way cross-tabs analysis offers a more complicated
exposition of the role of the plaintiff’s lawyers. 198 In most situations
(connection variables as the control), the three-way cross-tab analysis confirms
the trend identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a: the MOW litigant
without legal representation has a higher rate of success.199
TABLE 12A: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE
VILLAGE), AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=703)
Household
Registration

Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win

Yes*

LR of MOW No 20.63%
Yes 78.09%
Total
98.72%

80.69%
77.78%
78.39%

15.86% 3.45%
15.66% 6.56%
15.71% 5.91%

No

LR of MOW Yes

1.28%

22.22%

11.11% 66.67%

Total

1.28%

22.22%

11.11% 66.67%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=5.349, P=0.069.

197. Note that in some of the tables’ rows in this three-way cross-tabs analysis, the chi-square test is not
applicable due to an insufficient number of cases in each cell.
198. See infra Tables 12a–12j.
199. With the exception of two situations—see infra Tables 12e and 12g—the three-way cross-tabs
analysis presents a similar trend as identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a.
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TABLE 12B: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S PLACE OF BIRTH (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), AND
MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=526)
Born in the
village

Frequency Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

Yes*

LR of
MOW
Total

No
Yes

19.58%
78.71%
98.29%

75.73%
79.23%
78.53%

20.39%
15.94%
16.83%

3.88%
4.83%
4.64%

No

LR of
MOW
Total

No
Yes

0.57%
1.14%
1.71%

100.00%
83.33%
88.89%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

0.00%
16.67%
11.11%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=1.257, P=0.533.

TABLE 12C: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S ACTUAL RESIDENCE (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE),
AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=236)
Actual
residence
Yes

LR of MOW No
Yes

No

Total
LR of MOW No
Yes
Total

Frequency Complete
win

Partial Loss
win

16.10%

81.58%

18.42% 0.00%

58.05%
74.15%
2.97%
22.88%
25.85%

82.48%
82.29%
28.57%
38.89%
37.70%

16.06%
16.57%
28.57%
18.52%
19.67%

1.46%
1.14%
42.86%
42.59%
42.62%
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TABLE 12D: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW GROWING UP IN THE VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS
RATES (N=97)
Growing up
Frequency
in the village
Yes
LR of MOW No 15.46%
Yes 82.47%
97.94%
Total
No

LR of MOW Yes 2.06%
Total
2.00%

Complete
win
93.33%
85.00%
86.32%
2.06%
100%

Partial Loss
win
6.67% 0.00%
12.50% 2.50%
11.58% 2.11%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%

TABLE 12E: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S SOCIAL AND MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND
MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=233)
Social or
medical
insurance*
Yes
LR of MOW No
Yes
Total
No

Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
66.67%
83.06%
80.37%

22.22% 11.11%
10.93% 6.01%
12.79% 6.85%

LR of MOW Yes 6.01%

28.57%

7.14% 64.29%

Total

28.57%

7.14% 64.29%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=5.149, P=0.076 (<0.1).

15.45%
78.54%
93.99%

6.01%
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TABLE 12F: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S PRIMARY SOURCE OF INCOME, AND MOW’S SUCCESS
RATES (N=294)
Primary
Frequency Complete
source of
win
income
Yes
LR of MOW No 17.01%
88.00%
Yes 78.91%
88.36%
Total
95.92%
88.30%

Partial Loss
win

No

75.00% 25.00%
0.00% 100.00%
25.00% 75.00%

LR of MOW No 1.36%
Yes 2.72%
Total
4.08%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

12.00% 0.00%
11.21% 0.43%
11.35% 0.35%

TABLE 12G: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW CONTRACTING LAND IN THE VILLAGE, AND MOW’S
SUCCESS RATES (N=287)
Contracted
land
Yes

No

Frequency

Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

LR of No
MOW
Yes
Total
LR of No
MOW
Yes

15.33%

75.00%

20.45%

4.55%

75.96%
91.29%
1.74%

85.78%
83.97%
40.00%

11.47%
12.98%
40.00%

2.75%
3.05%
20.00%

6.97%

55.00%

25.00%

20.00%

Total

8.71%

52.00%

28.00%

20.00%
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TABLE 12H: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE VILLAGE, AND MOW’S
SUCCESS RATES (N=41)
Obligations or
contributions
Yes

No

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

LR of No
29.27%
MOW
Yes 48.78%
Total
78.05%

83.33%

16.67%

0.00%

70.00%
75.00%

30.00%
25.00%

0.00%
0.00%

LR of No
2.44%
MOW
Yes 19.51%
Total
21.95%

0.00%

0.00%

100.00%

25.00%
22.22%

12.50%
11.11%

62.50%
66.67%

TABLE 12I: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW POSSESSING A SHARE CERTIFICATE OF THE VILLAGE
COLLECTIVE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=50)
Share certificate
and others
Yes

No

Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
LR of No 44.00%
MOW
Yes 52.00%
Total
96.00%

54.55%

45.45% 0.00%

69.23%
62.50%

26.92% 3.85%
35.42% 2.08%

LR of No 2.00%
MOW
Yes 2.00%
Total
4.00%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%
50.00%

100.00% 0.00%
50.00% 0.00%

0.00%
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TABLE 12J: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S ENJOYMENT OF LAND RIGHTS AS MEMBER OF
HUSBAND’S VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=263)
Land rights
in husband’s
village
Yes
LR of
MOW No
Yes
Total
No

LR of
No
MOW
Yes
Total

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

0.38%

0.00%

0.00%

100.00%

0.76%
1.14%

50.00%
33.33%

0.00%
0.00%

50.00%
66.67%

17.49%

82.61%

15.22%

2.17%

81.37%

82.24%

11.21%

6.54%

98.86%

82.31%

11.92%

5.77%

In the bivariate analysis above, 200 which shows that MOW litigants’
success rate varied significantly by legal representation of the defendant (chisquare=33.206, p=0.000), it was found that the defendant with legal
representation had a higher rate of success. 201 As mentioned above, the
bivariate analysis may not give a complete picture since some of the
explanatory variables are correlated (a connection variable). It is therefore
necessary to perform a three-way cross-tabs analysis with a connection
variable as control.
This analysis demonstrates that when MOW’s household registrations
were in the village, legal representation of the defendant was significant in the
variation of the outcome (chi-square=27.698, P=0.000). 202 When MOW’s
household registrations were in the village and the defendant had legal
representation, MOW litigants’ losing rate was 10.96%, as compared to 3.55%
when the defendant had no legal representation.
When MOW were born in the natal village, legal representation of the
defendant is significant in the variation of MOW litigants’ success rates (chisquare=15.274, P=0.000).203 When MOW were born in the village and the
defendant had legal representation, the MOW litigants’ losing rate was 7.78%,

200. See supra Table 11a.
201. The losing rate of the MOW litigants was much higher (12.07%) when the defendant had legal
representation. The losing rate of the MOW litigant was 3.59% when the defendant had no legal
representation.
202. See infra Table 13a.
203. See infra Table 13b.
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as compared to a losing rate of 2.79% when the defendant had no legal
representation.
When MOW did not enjoy land rights in their husbands’ village, legal
representation of the defendant is significant in the variation of the outcome
(chi-square=18.113, P=0.000).204 When MOW did not enjoy land rights in
their husbands’ village and the defendant had legal representation, MOW
litigants’ losing rate was 12.47%, as compared to a losing rate of 1.78% when
the defendant had no legal representation.
For all other connection variables, legal representation of the defendant is
insignificant in the variation of the MOW litigants’ success rate.205
The above three-way cross-tabs analysis confirms the trend identified in
the bivariate analysis in Table 11a: the defendant with legal representation had
a higher rate of success. 206

TABLE 13A: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S HOUSEHOLD
REGISTRATION (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), AND MOW’S SUCCESS
RATES (N=678)
Household
Registration

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

Yes*

LR of the Yes 32.30%
VC
No 66.52%
Total
98.82%

67.58%
84.48%
78.96%

21.46%
11.97%
15.07%

10.96%
3.55%
5.97%

No

LR of the Yes 0.74%
VC
No 0.44%
1.18%
Total

20.00%
33.33%
25.00%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

80.00%
66.67%
75.00%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=27.698, P=0.000 (<0.01).

204. See infra Table 13j.
205. Note that, in some rows of the tables in this three-way cross-tabs analysis, the chi-square test is not
applicable due to insufficient number of cases in each cell.
206. See infra Tables 13a–13b, and 13j.

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2019]

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

RURAL LAND DISPUTES

51

TABLE 13B: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S PLACE OF BIRTH (IN OR
OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=512)
Born in the
Frequency Complete
village
win
Yes
LR of the Yes 35.16%
70.00%
VC
No 63.09%
84.21%
Total
98.24%
79.13%
No

LR of the Yes 0.39%
VC
No 1.37%
Total
1.76%

50.00%
100.00%
88.89%

Partial
win
22.22%
13.00%
16.30%

Loss
7.78%
2.79%
4.57%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

50.00%
0.00%
11.11%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=15.274, P=0.000 (<0.01).

TABLE 13C: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S PLACE OF BIRTH (IN OR
OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=233)
Actual
residence

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

Yes

LR of the Yes 16.31%
VC
No 59.23%
Total
75.54%

68.42%
88.41%
84.09%

31.58%
10.14%
14.77%

0.00%
1.45%
1.14%

No*

LR of the Yes 15.45%
VC
No 9.01%
Total
24.46%

33.33%
42.86%
36.84%

16.67%
23.81%
19.30%

50.00%
33.33%
43.86%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=1.517, P=0.468.
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TABLE 13D: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW GROWING UP IN THE
VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=100)
Growing up
in the village
Yes

No

LR of Yes
the VC No
Total
LR of No
the VC
Total

Frequency Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

39.00%
59.00%
98.00%
2.00%

82.05%
91.53%
87.76%
100%

12.82%
8.47%
10.20%
0.00%

5.13%
0.00%
2.04%
0.00%

2.00%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

TABLE 13E: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S SOCIAL AND MEDICAL
INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=235)
Social or
medical
insurance
Yes*
LR of the Yes
VC
No
Total
No

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

37.87%

79.78%

11.24%

8.99%

56.17%
94.04%

80.30%
80.09%

15.15%
13.57%

4.55%
6.33%

30.77%

0.00%

69.23%

0.00%
28.57%

100.00% 0.00%
7.14%
64.29%

LR of the Yes 5.53%
VC
No 0.43%
Total
5.96%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=2.259, P=0.323.
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TABLE 13F: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S PRIMARY SOURCE OF
INCOME, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=295)
Primary
source of
income
Yes
LR of the Yes
VC
No
Total

Frequency Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

34.58%

85.29%

14.71%

0.00%

61.69%
96.27%

91.21%
89.08%

8.24%
10.56%

0.55%
0.35%

No

3.39%

0.00%

20.00%

80.00%

0.34%
3.73%

0.00%
0.00%

100.00% 0.00%
27.27% 72.73%

LR of the Yes
VC
No
Total

TABLE 13G: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW CONTRACTING LAND IN THE
VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=288)
Contracted
land
Yes

No

Frequency Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

LR of Yes
the VC
No
Total

37.85%

86.24%

11.93%

1.83%

53.82%
91.67%

83.23%
84.47%

13.55%
12.88%

3.23%
2.65%

LR of Yes
the VC
No
Total

3.82%

45.45%

45.45%

9.09%

4.51%
8.33%

53.85%
50.00%

15.38%
29.17%

30.77%
20.83%
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TABLE 13H: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=38)
Obligations or
contributions
Yes

No

LR of Yes
the VC
No
Total
LR of Yes
the VC
No
Total

Frequency Complete Partial
win
win

Loss

39.47%

73.33%

26.67%

0.00%

42.11%
81.58%

81.25%
77.42%

18.75%
22.58%

0.00%
0.00%

2.63%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

15.79%
18.42%

0.00%
14.29%

16.67%
14.29%

83.33%
71.43%

TABLE 13I: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW POSSESSING A SHARE
CERTIFICATE OF THE VILLAGE COLLECTIVE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES
(N=50)
Share
certificates
and others
Yes
LR of the Yes
VC
No
Total
No
LR of the Yes
VC
Total

Frequency Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

40.00%

70.00%

30.00%

0.00%

58.00%
98.00%
2.00%

75.86%
73.47%
0.00%

20.69% 3.45%
24.49% 2.04%
100.00% 0.00%

2.00%

0.00%

100.00% 0.00%
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TABLE 13J: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S ENJOYMENT OF LAND
RIGHTS AS MEMBER OF HUSBAND’S VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES
(N=269)
Enjoy land rights in
husband’s village
Yes

No*

Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
LR of No 1.12%
the VC

33.33%

0.00% 66.67%

Total

33.33%

0.00% 66.67%

70.10%

17.53% 12.37%

88.76%
81.95%

9.47% 1.78%
12.41% 5.64%

1.12%

LR of Yes 36.06%
the VC
No 62.83%
Total
98.88%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=18.113, P=0.000 (<0.01).

G. LAW AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE
1.

National Statutes Applied in the Case

Among the various national statutes applied, the data shows (n=858) that
only the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL) 207 (chi-square=27.742,
P=0.000) had significance in the variation of the outcome.208 MOW’s success
rates are higher when GPCL is applied. The same is true for the Law on the
Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests.
The data also shows the variations of the outcome by applying other
relevant national statutes: Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees, Property
Law, Rural Land Contract Law, Land Management Law, and Law on
Population and Family Planning,209 and Tort Liability Law.210

207. Minfa Tongze ( 民 法 通 则 ) [General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4470.htm
(China).
208. See infra Table 14a.
209. Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa (人口与计划生育法) [Population and Family Planning Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2001,
effective Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.ht (China).
210. Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http://english.www.gov.cn/
archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474983043584.htm (China).
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TABLE 14A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY NATIONAL STATUTES (N=858)
Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
General Principles of Yes 54.78%
Civil Law
No 45.22%

77.02%

Organic
Law
Villagers’
Committees

73.84%

20.43% 2.55% 27.743
(0.000)
13.66% 10.57%

No

57.23%

78.41%

20.16% 5.99% 3.498
(0.174)
15.27% 6.31%

Law on the Protection Yes
of Women’s Rights No
and Interests

42.19%
57.81%

83.70%
71.17%

16.30% 0.00%
18.15% 10.69%

Yes 25.29%

81.57%

No

74.71%

74.73%

13.36% 5.07% 4.248
(0.12)
18.72% 6.55%

Rural Land Contract Yes
Law
No

6.53%
93.47%

85.71%
75.81%

12.50% 1.79%
17.71% 6.48%

Land
Law

6.06%
93.94%

69.23%
76.92%

25.00% 5.77%
16.87% 6.20%

Yes 2.10%
No 97.90%

88.89%
76.19%

5.56% 5.56%
17.62% 6.19%

Law on Population Yes 1.28%
and Family Planning No 98.72%

72.73%
76.51%

27.27% 0.00%
17.24% 6.26%

100.00%
76.24%

0.00% 0.00%
17.53% 6.24%

Property Law

of Yes 42.77%

75.77%

Chisquare

Management Yes
No

Marriage Law

Tort Liability Law

2.

Yes 0.93%
No 99.07%

National Judicial and Administrative Rules Applied in the Case

Among the various national level judicial and administrative rules
applied—including the Implementation Rules for Land Management Law,211

211. Tudi Guanli Shishi Tiaoli (土地管理实施条例) [Land Administration Law of the People's Republic
of China] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 27, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999);
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5139471.htm.
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SPC’s Reply on Disputes of Allocating Rural Collective Economic Benefits,212
and Central Government’s Rule on Protecting Rural Women’s Land
Rights 213 —the data shows (n=858) that only section 24 of the SPC’s
Explanation on Rural Land Contract Disputes (RLCD) (chi-square=14.692,
P=0.001) had significance in the variations in the outcome.214 The data shows
that the losing rate is higher (2.42% difference) when RLCD is not applied in
the case.
TABLE 14B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY NATIONAL JUDICIAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES (N=858)

SPC’s Explanation on
Rural Land Contract
Disputes*

Yes

26.34%

67.26% 24.78% 7.96%

3.61%

70.97% 16.13% 12.90%

96.39%

76.66% 17.41% 5.93%

1.86%

43.75% 56.25% 0.00%

98.14%

77.08% 16.63% 6.29%

Yes

0.35%

66.67% 33.33% 0.00%

No

99.65%

76.49% 17.31% 6.20%

No

Implementation Rules for Yes
Land Management Law
No
SPC’s Reply on Disputes of Yes
Allocating Rural Collective
Economic Benefits
No
Central Government’s
Rule on Protecting Rural
Women’s Land Rights

Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
73.66%
79.75% 14.72% 5.54%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=14.692, P=0.001 (<0.01).

212. Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Dui Nongcun Jiti Jingji Suode Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen Shifou Shouli Wenti de
Dafu (关于人民法院对农村集体经济所得收益分配纠纷是否受理问题的答复) [Reply of the Supreme
People’s Court on Disputes of Allocating Rural Collective Econ. Benefits] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct.,
July
9,
2001),
http://pkulaw.cn/(S(21ctss45i13hjxjvmt44tijw))/fulltext_form.aspx?
Db=alftwotitle&Gid=61542d7bfe1bf1b3bdfb (China).
213. Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Qieshi Weihu Nongcun
Funü Tudi Chengbao Quanyi de Tongzhi (中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅关于切实维护农村妇女土地承
包权益 的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the
State Council on Protecting Rural Women’s Land Rights] (promulgated by the Gen. Office, CPC Cen. Comm.
and the Gen. Office of the St. Council, May. 8, 2001, effective May. 8, 2001),
http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl508s518.txt (China).
214. See infra Table 14b.
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Provincial Statutes, Administrative Rules, and Judicial Rules
Applied in the Case

The data shows that when courts applied provincial statutes that protected
women’s rights (n=858),215 the MOW litigants’ success rate was 100%.216
The data also shows the MOW litigants’ success rates when the following
were applied: 217 (1) provincial statutes/administrative rules that regulate
population and family planning, the rural collective economy, and land
contracts;218 and (2) pro-MOW provincial judicial rules.219

215. See supra Table 14b; see also, e.g., Fujiansheng Shishi Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funü Quanyi
Baozhang Fa Banfa (福建省 实施《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》办法) [Implementation Measures of
Fujian Province on Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. People’s Cong. Fujian Province, Nov. 12, 1993, rev’d Sept. 28, 2008, effective Dec. 1, 2008),
http://www.fujian.gov.cn/zc/flfg/dfxfg/200902/t20090224_1200100.htm (China); Guangdongsheng Shishi
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa Banfa (广东省实施《中华人民共和国妇女 权益
保障法》办法) [Implementation Measures of Guangdong Province on Law on the Protection of Women’s
Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Guangdong Province, May. 31,
2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), CLI.10.173469 (China).
216. See infra Table 14c.
217. See infra Table 14c.
218. See, e.g., Guangdongsheng Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Guanli Guiding (广东省农村集体经济组织管
理 规定) [Provisions of Guangdong Province for the Administration on Rural Econ. Collective] (promulgated
by the Guangdong Province Government, Aug. 9, 2006, effective Oct. 1, 2006),
http://www.gdagri.gov.cn/ywzx/ncjjzzglc/201507/t20150723486299.html (China).
219. See, e.g., Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Tudi Buchangfei Fenpei Jiufen Anjian Ruogan
Wenti de Yijian (关于审理农村集体经济组织土地补偿费分配纠纷案件若干问题的意见) [Opinions on
Adjudicating Cases of Disputes on Allocation of Land Indemnity of Rural Econ. Collective (For Trial
Implementation)] (promulgated by the High Ct. Hainan Province, June 8, 2012, effective June 8, 2012)
(Westlaw China).
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TABLE 14C: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY PROVINCIAL STATUTES,
ADMINISTRATIVE/ JUDICIAL RULES (N=858)
Frequency Complete
win
Provincial statutes Yes
protecting
No
women’s rights

Provincial statutes Yes, but not
on population and directly
family planning
relevant
No
Provincial
administrative
provisions on
rural collective
economy

Yes, but not
directly
relevant
No

Provincial statutes Yes, but not
on land contract
directly
relevant
No

Partial
win

Loss

6.53%

92.86%

7.14%

0.00%

93.47%

75.31%

18.08%

6.61%

1.52%

76.92%

23.08%

0.00%

98.48%

76.45%

17.28% 6.27%

0.47%

75.00%

25.00%

99.53%

76.46%

17.33% 6.21%

0.35%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

99.65%

76.37%

17.43%

6.20%

0.00%

Provincial judicial Yes
rules (pro-MOW)
No

1.06%

88.89%

11.11%

0.00%

98.95%

76.33%

17.43%

6.24%

Yes

1.05%

77.78%

22.22%

0.00%

No

98.95%

76.44%

17.31%

6.24%

Human rights

4.

Court’s Reference to “Human Rights” in Its Judgment

An interesting observation can be drawn from the nine cases (frequency
rate of 1.05%)220 that mentioned “human rights.”221 All cases were from the
220. See supra Table 14c.
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Hunan Province, handed down by four different judges from three courts, and
decided in 2017.222 It appears that whether the court uses the term “human
rights” is very judge-specific. The location and the judicial atmosphere of the
court may also play a role.
5.

Court Applying Substantive Law, Procedural Law, or Both

The data shows (n=858) the outcome varied significantly by the court
applying substantive law, procedural law, 223 or both (chi-square=18.554,
P=0.001).224
TABLE 15: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW,
PROCEDURAL LAW, OR BOTH (N=858)
Frequency Complete Partial
win
win
Civil
Procedure
Law

Loss

Chisquare

Yes

54.90%

77.49%

17.20% 5.31%

No

45.10%

75.19%

17.57% 7.24%

41.49%

79.78%

14.33% 5.90% 18.554
(0.001)

2.91%

56.00%

20.00% 24.00%

55.59%

75.05%

19.50% 5.45%

Legal basis
Substantive
substantive or law
procedural
Procedural
law
Both

1.442
(0.486)

221. The courts are not allowed to directly apply the PRC Constitution. The phrase “human rights” is
highly sensitive and seldom referred to in court decisions.
222. See, e.g., Yuan Xingu, Yuan Ruijie Yu Zhuzhou Shi Lusong Qu Baiguan Zhen Chengjiaba Cun
Hehua Zu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu, at 1 (袁新谷、袁睿婕
与株洲市芦 淞区白关镇城家坝村荷花组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷一审民事判决书 ) [Civil
Judgement for Court of First Instance of Yuan Xingu & Yuan Ruijie v. Hehua Grp., Chengjiaba Village,
Baiguan Town, Lusong District, Zhuzhou City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ.
Collective] (Zhuzhou Lusong Dist. People’s Ct. Apr. 17, 2017) (China); Zhang Qingrong Yu Zhuzhou Shi
Lusong Qu Baiguan Zhen Chengjiaba Cun Hehua Zu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen
Yishen Minshi Panjueshu, at 1 (张清荣与株洲市芦淞区白关镇城家坝村荷花组侵害集体经济组织成员权
益纠纷一审民事判决书) [Civil Judgement for Court of First Instance of Zhang Qingrong v. Hehua Grp.,
Chengjiaba Village, Baiguan Town, Lusong District, Zhuzhou City on Infringing Rights and Interests of
Members of Econ. Collective] (Zhuzhou Lusong Dist. People’s Ct. May 1, 2017) (China).
223. Minshi Susong Fa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) (China).
224. See supra Table 15.
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H. VILLAGE INTERNAL RULES
The data shows (see Table 16a) that the outcome varied significantly by
the appearance of “villagers’ charter” in the judgment (chi-square=12.472,
P=0.002) in the court decision.225 Whenever “villagers’ charter” appeared in
the court decision, MOW litigants had a lower losing rate—2%—as compared
to a losing rate of 6.66% when “villagers’ charter” did not appear. The lower
losing rate shows that the court probably conducted a substantive review of the
villagers’ charter,226 and it ruled in favor of the MOW after concluding that the
charter discriminated against the MOW.227
The data shows (n=20)228 that MOW had the highest losing rate when the
court confirmed the villagers’ charter regarding the determination of
membership status (100%), and the lowest losing rate when the court either
rejected the villagers’ charter (regarding determination of membership status)
or refused to decide on the issue (both at 0%). The losing rate was at 40%
when the court remained silent on the issue.229
The data shows (n=97)230 that MOW had the lowest losing rate when the
court rejected the villagers’ charter regarding the allocation arrangement (0%),
and the highest losing rate when the court deferred the issue to the village
(42.86%). The losing rate was at 33.33% when the court confirmed the
villagers’ charter regarding the allocation arrangement.231

225. See infra Table 16a.
226. The phrase “villagers’ charter” would only appear in the court decision if the villagers’ charter denied
MOW’s right to compensation.
227. In other words, the court in this situation did not simply adopt the villagers’ charter in the name of
village autonomy. It shows that, while the political process in China delegated power to the village
organization to decide matters within the village’s de facto autonomy, judicial power sometimes penetrated
this autonomy and reversed some local norms and regulations. For a case example, see He X Su Chenzhou Shi
Suxian Qu Bailutang Zhen Yashi Cun Disi Cunmin Xiaozu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen
An, at 1 (何 X 诉郴州市苏仙区白露塘镇雅市村第四村民小组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [He X
v. No. 4 Villager Grp., Yashi Village, Bailutang Town, Suxian Dist., Chenzhou City on Infringing Rights and
Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Suzhou Dist. People’s Ct. Feb. 13, 2012) (China).
228. See infra Table 16a. The “treatment” of MOW’s membership status by the villagers’ charter must be
negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court.
229. See supra Table 16a.
230. See supra Table 16a. The “treatment” of MOW’s membership status by the villagers’ charter must be
negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court.
231. See supra Table 16a.
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TABLE 16A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY VARIABLES RELATING TO
VILLAGERS’ CHARTER

Appearance
in
Court
decision*
(n=851)
Court
decision on
charter
(membership
status) (n=20)

Court
Decision on
charter
(allocation
arrangement)
(n=97)

Frequency Complete
win

Partial
win

Loss

Yes
No

11.75%
88.25%

69%
77.50%

29%
15.85%

2.00%
6.66%

Confirm
charter

10%

0.00%

0.00%

100%

Reject
charter
Silent
Decline to
make
decision
Confirm
charter

50%

50%

50.00%

0.00%

25%
15%

60%
0.00%

0.00%
100%

40%
0.00%

3.09%

33.33%

33.33%

33.33%

Reject
charter

89.69%

72.41%

27.59%

0.00%

Defer to VC

7.22%

28.57%

28.57%

42.86%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=12.472, P=0.002 (2-SIDED).

Interestingly, whenever “allocation agreement” appeared in the court
decision,232 MOW litigants had a higher losing rate (8.11%), as compared to a
losing rate of 2.98% when “allocation agreement” did not appear. This is
inconsistent with the above finding on the appearance of “villagers’ charters”
in court decisions, an inconsistency that cannot be explained. 233 The data
shows that the outcome varied significantly by the appearance of “allocation
agreement” (chi-square=10.457, P=0.005) in the court decision.
The data shows (n=33)234 that MOW had the highest losing rate when the
court confirmed the allocation agreement regarding the determination of
232. See infra Table 16b.
233. Nonetheless, this may be attributed to the fact that the allocation agreement—a more technical
document—is more subtle than the villagers’ charter when it comes to denying MOW’s rights. The court, even
having conducted a substantive review of the allocation agreement, is less likely to be able to pinpoint any
specific discriminatory provisions in the allocation agreement (unlike the villagers’ charter) to help MOW.
234. See infra Table 16b. The “treatment” of MOW’s membership status by the allocation agreement must
be negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court.
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membership status (100%), and the lowest losing rate when the court rejected
the allocation agreement regarding membership status (0%). The losing rate
was at 75% percent when the court deferred the issue to the village.235
The data shows (n=372)236 that MOW had the lowest losing rate when the
court altered or rejected the allocation agreement on compensation allocation
(both at 0%), and the highest losing rate when the court remained silent on this
issue (both at 100%). The losing rate was 58.33% when the court confirmed
the allocation agreement, and then 87.50% when the court deferred the issue to
the village.237
TABLE 16B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY VARIABLES RELATING TO THE
ALLOCATION AGREEMENT
Frequency Complete Partial Loss
win
win
Appearance in the
Yes
court decision*
No
(n=854)
Procedural defects in Yes
allocation agreement No
(n=496)
Decision
on Confirm
allocation agreement allocation
(membership status) agreement

60.66%
39.34%

73.75%
80.65%

18.15% 8.11%
16.37% 2.98%

2.02%
97.98%

80%
73.87%

20%
0.00%
17.7% 8.44%

3.03%

0.00%

0.00% 100%

(n=33)

84.85%

75%

25.00% 0.00%

Defer to VC 12.12%

25%

0.00% 75%

6.45%
1.34%
88.71%

25%
20%
83.33%

16.67% 58.33%
80%
0.00%
16.67% 0.00%

1.34%
2.15%

0.00%
0.00%

0.00% 100%
12.50% 87.5%

Reject
allocation
agreement

Court decision on
Confirm
allocation agreement Alter
(allocation
Reject
arrangement)
(n=372)
Silent
Defer to VC
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=10.457, P=0.005 (2-SIDED).

235. See infra Table 16b.
236. See infra Table 16b. The “treatment” of compensation allocation by the allocation agreement must be
negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court.
237. See infra Table 16b.
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PREVIOUS DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1.

Previous Judicial Proceedings

In some cases, the plaintiff (MOW) and/or the defendant (VC) in the
current litigation had previously litigated on the allocation of compensation for
MOW (Previous Judicial Proceedings).238
From the data (n=802), 13.47% of the cases involved Previous Judicial
Proceedings where the same MOW litigant sued the same defendant village
organization and had her membership confirmed. Of these cases, 0.25%
involved Previous Judicial Proceedings where the same MOW litigant sued the
same defendant village organization and had her membership denied. Of these
cases, 0.12% involved Previous Judicial Proceedings where the same MOW
litigant sued the same defendant village organization, and the court refused to
make a decision on the matter.
TABLE 17: MOW’S SUCCESS RATE BY PREVIOUS DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Judicial
Decision
(n=802)

Frequency

Complete Partial Loss
win
win

83.92%

76.37%

16.34% 7.28%

Yes, and confirmed 13.47%
membership

79.63%

20.37% 0.00%

Yes, and denied 0.25%
membership

50.00%

0.00%

50.00%

Yes, and rejected 1.25%
previous
Allocation Agt. (w/
another MOW)

70.00%

0.00%

30.00%

Yes, and refused to 0.12%
decide
on
membership
Yes, no outcome 1.00%
recorded

0.00%

100.00% 0.00%

62.50%

37.50% 0.00%

77.13%

16.79% 6.08%

No

No
Admin.
Complaints

238. See infra Table 17.

81.97%
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76.80%
0.00%

23.20% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00%

Yes, no resolution 2.97%
Yes, no outcome 0.12%
recorded

68.00%
100.00%

8.00%
0.00%

No

75.42%

18.21% 6.37%

a 0.35%

66.67%

33.33% 0.00%

a 7.62%

87.69%

10.77% 1.54%

The same VC vs. 1.88%
another MOW

100.00%

0.00%

No

77.46%

16.43% 6.12%

28.57%

71.43% 0.00%

100.00%
44.44%

0.00% 0.00%
44.44% 11.11%

Yes,
with
settlement
Yes, without
settlement

Citizens’
Petition
(Xinfang)
(n=852)

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

90.15%

97.89%

Yes,
favored 0.82%
MOW
Yes, against MOW 0.23%
Yes, no outcome 1.06%
recorded

24.00%
0.00%

0.00%

One percent of the cases involved Previous Judicial Proceedings where
the same MOW litigant sued the same defendant village organization, but the
outcome of the cases was not provided.
It is interesting that defendants in 13.47% of the cases continued with a
distribution policy knowing that it contradicted the decision of the court in the
Previous Judicial Proceedings.239 This is contrasted with only 0.25% of the
cases where the plaintiff sued again knowing that the court had already ruled
against her in the Previous Judicial Proceedings.
In 1.25% of the cases, there were Previous Judicial Proceedings where
another MOW litigant had sued the same village organization and won.

239. See Zhang Lihong Deng Su Changsha Shi Yuhua Qu Dongjing Zhen Tianhua Cun Cunmin
Weiyuanhui Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen An (张利红等诉长沙市雨花区洞井镇天华村村民委员会
集体经济组织收益分配纠纷案) [Zhang Lihong et al. v. Villager Comm., Tianhua Village, Dongjing Town,
Yuhua District, Changsha City on Dispute of Income Distribution of Members of Econ. Collective] (Changsha
Yuhua Dist. People’s Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (China).
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Previous Administrative Complaints

In some cases,240 the plaintiff had lodged an administrative complaint
with the relevant township government authority against the defendant prior to
the commencement of the judicial proceedings (Previous Administrative
Complaint).241
From the data (n=843), 14.83% of the cases involved a Previous
Administrative Complaint in which the relevant township government
authority had ruled in favor of the MOW. The data shows that a favorable
decision for the MOW in the Previous Administrative Complaint guarantees
victory for the MOW in the ensuing judicial proceedings.
In 0.12% of the cases there was a Previous Administrative Complaint in
which the relevant authority had ruled against MOW. The data shows that an
unfavorable decision for the MOW in the Previous Administrative Complaint
guarantees defeat for the MOW in the ensuing judicial proceedings.
In 2.97% of the cases there was a Previous Administrative Complaint
with no outcome. In this situation, the MOW’s losing rate was 24%,
substantially higher than the losing rate when there was no Previous
Administrative Complaint at all (6.08%). A possible explanation is that the
court views a non-decision by the administrative authority as an indication of
the lack of merit in the MOW’s case, thereby placing MOW in a less
advantageous position in the ensuing judicial proceedings.
In 0.12% of the cases there was a Previous Administrative Complaint, but
no further information was provided regarding the decision of the relevant
authority.
3.

Previous Citizens’ Petition

In some cases,242 the plaintiff had lodged a citizens’ petition (letters and
visits, or xinfang) with the relevant authority against the defendant (VC) prior
to the commencement of the judicial proceedings (Previous Citizens’
Petition).243
From the data (n=852), 0.82% of the cases involved a Previous Citizens’
Petition in which the relevant authority had ruled in favor of the MOW. In
0.23% of the cases, there was a Previous Citizens’ Petition in which the
relevant authority had ruled against the MOW. In 1.06 % of the cases, there
was a Previous Citizens’ Petition, but no outcome of the petition was
provided.244

240.
241.
242.
243.
126–28.
244.

See supra Table 17.
See He, supra note 23.
See supra Table 17.
For an explanation of the role of xinfang in China’s judicial politics, see NG & HE, supra note 29, at
See supra Table 17.
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PROCEDURAL VARIABLES

In Table 18a, the data shows (n=858) that, in 36.83% of the cases, the
defendant in single-defendant cases, or all defendants in multiple-defendant
cases, was or were absent at trial (complete trial in absentia). In 60.49% of the
cases, the defendant or all defendants was or were present at trial. It is quite
clear from the data that a complete trial in absentia substantially lowers the
losing rate of the MOW litigant.
From the data, 2.68% were cases with multiple defendants where at least
one co-defendant was present and at least one co-defendant was absent (partial
trial in absentia). It appears that MOW litigants fared better in partial trial in
absentia cases when compared to cases where the defendant (in singledefendant cases, or all defendants in multiple-defendant cases) was present at
trial. However, the MOW is worse off in partial trial in absentia cases when
compared to complete trial in absentia cases.
TABLE 18A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY ATTENDANCE OF THE DEFENDANT
(N=858)
Trial in Absentia* Frequency
Yes
Partially
No

36.83%
2.68%
60.49%

Complete win Partial Win

Loss

85.44%
78.26%
70.91%

2.85%
4.35%
8.29%

11.71%
17.39%
20.81%

*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=24.334, P=0.000 (<0.01).

Another procedural variable in Table 18b is the burden of proof in
determining whether the village land or its derivative interests constitutes the
primary source of income of MOW litigants which is, in itself, a connection
variable. 245 From the data (n=189), 43.92% were cases where the court
imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiff (MOW). In this situation, the
complete winning rate of MOW litigants was 67.47%, the partial winning rate
was 10.84% and the losing rate was 21.69%. This is contrasted with cases
where the court imposed the burden of proof on the defendant (VC) (a rate of
frequency of 56.08%), in which the complete winning rate of the MOW
litigants was 90.57%, the partial winning rate was 9.43% and the losing rate
was 0%.246

245. This variable relates to the burden of proof only. It does not reveal the actual number of cases in
which the village land or its derivative interests constitutes the primary source of income of the MOW litigant.
246. See infra Table 18b. For MOW litigants with existing land rights in the village, the court considers it
a relevant factor if the MOW litigant relies on such rights as her primary source of income, and whether she
exercises the such rights by way of engaging in agricultural activities or by receiving rental income (if the land
is rented out).
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TABLE 18B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY BURDEN OF PROOF FOR PRIMARY
SOURCE OF INCOME (N=189)
Burden of Proof for Frequency
Primary Source of Income
The MOW
The Village Collective

43.92%
56.08%

Complete
win

Partial
Win

Loss

67.47%
90.57%

10.84%
9.43%

21.69%
0.00%

VI. DISCUSSION
A. THE HAVE-NOTS CAME OUT AHEAD
As shown above in Table 4, the MOW litigant (the plaintiff/ the “havenot”) prevailed over the village collective (the defendant/ the “have”) with a
“complete winning rate” of 76.50%. The MOW litigant only lost 6.20% of the
time.
The results of this study clearly contradict Galanter’s party capability
theory. In He and Su’s Study, across all types of parties and disputes, the OS
(as plaintiff) only completely won 19.49% of the time when matched against
the RP (as defendant).247 If one focuses on the type of dispute and nature of the
parties that bears the closest resemblance to MOW lawsuits—the farmer
(“have-nots”) suing the government agency or government-related company
(“haves”)—the data in He and Su’s Study shows that the farmer loses 100% of
the time. The stark difference in outcome between this study and He and Su’s
Study suggests that some factors other than party capability had reversed the
power balance between the parties.
WHY DID THE “HAVE-NOTS” PREVAIL?—THE COURTS FAVORED THE
“HAVE-NOTS”
This study shows the individual OS litigant from an underprivileged
group (MOW) prevailed over the institutional government-backed RP (village
collectives). This discovery is particularly significant because the Chinese
judicial system, similar to its counterparts in other authoritarian states, is
commonly seen as a system that favors the “haves” in a disproportionate
manner due to the lack of judicial independence (which enhances the
likelihood of courts being swayed by powerful external influence in favor of
the stronger party).248 The data, however, shows the courts favored the “havenots” over the “haves.” It is believed that the judicial favor for MOW has
B.

247. He and Su, supra note 2, at 130 tbl.1.
248. He and Su, supra note 2, at 123; Xifen Lin & Wei Shen, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in
China’s Prisons?—An Empirical Study of China’s Commutation Procedures, INT. J. L., CRIME & JUST., Mar.
2017, at 1, 2 (2017).
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neutralized the party-capability advantages enjoyed by the village collectives
(the “haves”) and propelled the MOW (the “have-nots”) to victory.249 One
informant confirmed that courts generally favored MOW—recognizing that
they have basic rights in their natal village— 250 and legislations were
interpreted in a way that helps MOW.251 The data supports the view that courts
favored MOW.
First, courts have consistently applied statutory provisions favorable to
MOW (see Tables 14a and 14b), and avoided dealing with the legislative
loopholes and inconsistencies that help the village collective.252 For example,
the courts applied the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests
42.19% of the time,253 with provisions highly favorable to the MOW litigant
(such as Articles 32 and 33).254 Similarly, courts have consistently applied the
Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees (such as Article 27).255
Second, Article 24 of the SPC’s Explanation on Rural Land Contract
Disputes can be interpreted both ways—either favorable or unfavorable to the
MOW. Although Article 24 clearly stated that courts should uphold equal
249. Another reason that explains the have-nots coming out ahead, albeit slightly remote, is the
international scrutiny exercised by the CEDAW Committee on China. With its latest report to the CEDAW
Committee due (China was due to submit its latest report to the CEDAW Committee by 1 November 2018),
China desperately needs to show to the international community the progress that it has made on the MOW
issue. There is some speculation that ongoing international pressure in the past years has translated into
domestic policies that favored MOW litigants. One example of these policies is the latest notice issued by the
SPC on the enforcement of law in rural China. The MOW issue was specifically mentioned (in art. 37):
“[rural] married-out women must be protected according to the law and regulations”. See Guanyu Wei Shishi
Xiangcun Zhenxing Zhanlüe Tigong Sifa Fuwu he Baozhang De Yijian (关于为实施乡村振兴战略提供司法
服务和保障的意见) [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards
for Implementation of Village Revitalization Strategy] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 23, 2018,
effective Oct. 23, 2018) (China).
250. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Male, Judge, Jiangxi Province Basic-Level Court (Apr. 2,
2018) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province]. This view is confirmed by a
practicing lawyer who handled numerous MOW lawsuits. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Male
Lawyer, Beijing (Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Male Attorney].
251. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156.
252. See supra note 19 accompanying text.
253. When Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests is applied the losing rate of the MOW
litigant is lower (0%) than when it is not applied (10.69%).
254. Courts in these cases emphasized that MOW should be treated equally, and marriage should not be an
excuse to deprive her of her rights. See, e.g., Chen Li yu Wenchang Shi Wencheng Zhen Liaoyuan Cunmin
Weiyuanhui Houlangchen Cunmin Xiaozu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen (陈丽与文昌市
文城镇燎原村民委员会后崀陈村民小组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷) [In re Dispute on Infringing
Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective between Chen Li & Houlangchen Village Comm.,
Wencheng Town, Wenchang City] (Wenchang City People’s Ct. Apr. 15, 2014) (China).
255. Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees was applied 42.77% of the time. See supra Table 14a. In
cases where the court applied the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, the court emphasized the need of
circumventing the authority of the villagers committee to ensure the legality of its action. See supra note 19.
See, e.g., Zhang Moumou Deng Su Lanzhou Shi Xigu Qu Hekou Xiang Datan Cunmin Weiyuanhui Deng
Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen (张某某等诉兰州市西固区河口乡大滩村民委员会等侵害
集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Zhang Moumou v. Datan Village Comm., Hekou Township, Xigu Dist.,
Lanzhou City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Lanzhou Xigu Dist.
People’s Ct. Aug. 4, 2015) (China).

E - CHAN_34 (TRANSMIT) (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

70

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

11/19/2019 8:28 AM

[Vol. 71:1

rights of village collective members in the allocation of compensation, the test
for “membership” is not provided. The court is at liberty to say Article 24 is
inapplicable as the MOW has not been confirmed a member.256 Yet the data
shows that whenever Article 24 was applied,257 the MOW litigant loses less
often, at 5.54%, as compared to 7.96% when Article 24 is not applied (chisquare=14.692, p=0.001). Thus, when the court had discretion to interpret a
rule one way or another, it chose to interpret it in a way that favors MOW.
Third, the data also shows that most courts are not concerned with the
policy of “village autonomy,” or rural self-governance, key principles
underscoring the village collective’s case. The data in Table 7 shows that the
overwhelming majority of courts did not mention “village autonomy” in their
judgment (90.68%). This shows that the principle of village autonomy has
become less important for courts in adjudicating MOW lawsuits.258
Fourth, courts generally do not believe the village collective has the
discretion to determine the membership issue when the lawsuit is already in
progress.259 The data in Table 6 shows that the courts in 92.46% of the cases
had directly confirmed the membership statuses of MOW without giving any
discretion to the village collectives. In all these cases, MOW litigants had
either completely won or partially won (no losses at all).
Fifth, the data in Table 10 shows courts generally side with MOW
whenever a connection is established between MOW and their natal villages
(see Table 10). 260 With the exception of “growing up in the village” and
256. See generally Liu Yu Yu Langxi Xian Jianping Zhen Wenchang Shequ Jumin Weiyuanhui Liuwan
Cunminzu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu (刘玉与郎溪县建平镇
文昌社区居民委员会刘湾村民组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷一审民事判决书) [Civil Judgement of
Liu Yu v. Liuwan Villager Grp., Wenchang Cmty. Residents Comm., Jianping Town, Langxi Cty. on
Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Lanxi Cty. People’s Ct. Aug. 3, 2016)
(China) (exemplifying a decision where the court exercised its discretion to interpret Article 24 of the SPC’s
Explanation on Rural Land Contract Disputes in a way that was unfavorable to MOW). But see Peng Qiumi Su
Xiamen Shi Xiang’an Qu Xindian Zhen Shamei Shequ Diwu Jumin Xiaozu Qinfan Jiti Jingji Zuzhi
Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (彭秋密诉厦门市翔安区新店镇沙美社区第五居民小组侵犯集体经济组织成
员权益纠纷案) [Peng Qiumi v. No. 5 Resident Grp., Shamei Cmty., Xindian Town, Xiang’an Dist., Xiamen
City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Xiamen Xiang’an Dist. People’s Ct.
Dec. 17, 2010) (China) (exemplifying a decision where the court exercised its discretion to interpret Article 24
of the SPC’s Explanation on Rural Land Contract Disputes in a way that was favorable to the MOW).
257. See, e.g., Yuangao Qing Lan, Guo Mou Su Beigao Kulun Zhen Shangyang Xumu Gacha Weiyuanhui
Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen (原告青兰、郭某诉被告库伦镇上养畜牧嘎查委员会侵害
集体经济组织成员权益纠纷) [Qing Lan & Guo Mou v. Shangyang Xumu Gacha Comm., Kulun Town on
Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Kulun Cty. People’s Ct. Nov. 27, 2014)
(China).
258. While one may argue that courts may have considered or applied the principle despite not having
referred to it explicitly in the decision, the very low losing rate (4.88%) suggests that only a small fraction of
cases would be in that category. Even when the court expressly referred to the principle (9.32% of the cases),
the combined winning rate was still much higher than the losing rate. This shows that the principle is no longer
an overriding consideration, albeit still a relevant consideration for some courts, in adjudicating these cases.
259. See supra Table 5. In only 2.36% of cases, the court left it to the village collective to decide on the
issue of membership.
260. While the study cannot provide any causal observation between the connection variable and the
outcome, it reveals that courts in China do find the various connection variables relevant in adjudicating MOW
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“possessing a share certificate,” the presence of all other connections tends to
help MOW’s cases.261
Sixth, the data in Table 4 shows that 77.63% of the monetary claims had
a recovery rate of 100%. This is a very high recovery rate by any standard,
which shows that courts favor MOW litigants.262
Seventh, the data shows the plaintiffs without legal representation had a
higher success rate than plaintiffs with representation. 263 This outcome is
possibly the result of the court favoring the weakest of the weak (the
unrepresented “have-nots” being even weaker than the represented “havenots”).264 If this is true, and using the same logic, it reinforces the view that the
courts favored the weaker party (MOW) in these cases.
Finally, when deciding who bears the burden of proof in relation to
MOW’s primary source of income, Table 18b shows that the court imposed the
burden on the defendant 56.08% of the time and on the plaintiff only 43.92%
of the time. This is interesting as the plaintiff is the one who is trying to show
connection with her natal village. It shows the court’s favor towards the
plaintiff, even in the allocation of evidential responsibility.
C.

WHY DID THE COURTS FAVOR THE “HAVE-NOTS”?
1.

Courts Generally Sympathized with the MOW and Believed They
Were Being Treated Unfairly in the Compensation Allocation
Process
MOW litigants in China find themselves in a precarious position. On the
one hand, because MOW are “married-out,” their natal villages excluded them
in all rural land compensation distributions.265 On the other hand, MOW are
not guaranteed land ownership in their husbands’ villages due to policy
reasons.266 In fact, most of the time, due to the “no change for thirty years”
cases. As noted earlier, the law is silent on what criteria qualify an individual for village collective
membership. The court, if it follows the principle of “village autonomy”, should either completely defer to the
village collective or confirm the collective’s decision, no matter what that decision is.
261. See supra Table 10.
262. But in certain regions, courts tend to find a midway solution by “discounting” the compensation that
the plaintiff would get, even if the plaintiff successfully established her case. Interview with Anonymous
Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156.
263. See supra Table 11a. The three-way cross-tab analysis that shows a similar trend.
264. See supra Table 11a. One possible explanation for unrepresented MOW’s higher success rate is that
the court sympathizes with them and adopts a more relaxed approach (both procedurally and in deciding the
substantive case) as compared to MOW who are represented.
265. Historically, only men get to inherit property. Women play a subservient role to their husband within
the family. Many of the cultural biases against women have continued in modern-day rural China.
266. Judd, supra note 14, at 690; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Rangita de Silva de Alwis, The Recently
Revised Marriage Law of China: The Promise and the Reality, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 251, 267 (2004)
(“[W]omen must rely more heavily on adjustment in landholdings to obtain land. With growing official
discouragement and legal limitation of readjustments, women increasingly have difficulty obtaining land in
their husbands’ villages or retaining land in their parents’ villages.”).
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land policy in China, the MOW receive no land interests in their husbands’
villages. 267 The discrimination against MOW within Chinese rural
communities has been institutionalized. 268 It is observed that courts generally
sympathized with MOW litigants and believed they were treated unfairly in the
compensation allocation process. One informant confirms that most courts
recognize the difficult situation MOW litigants are in and believe they have
been unfairly treated by their natal village collectives.269 In those courts’ view,
such unfair treatment is a violation of gender equality laws.270 Perhaps the
courts understand that, if they were to treat MOW lawsuits as “arms-length”
lawsuits, MOW litigants will very likely fail, an outcome that they find unjust
and an infringement of the principle of gender equality.271
2.

Courts Sided with the “Have-Nots” to Establish Their Own
Legitimacy

The Chinese courts fit well into Haynie’s theoretical framework under
which courts in developing countries deliberately favor the “have-nots” to
establish their own legitimacy, which in turn secures stability and
development. 272 Courts in China are institutionally weak, especially when
compared to their counterparts in developed countries. They inherit a tainted
public image from the previous period in which courts operated very much like
mediation centers, rather than arbiters of justice.273 Courts need to be strategic
to improve their position among “superior authorities.”274 By establishing a
reputation for defending the weak, the judiciary is able to wield informal
power within the Chinese political structure, which in turn elevates the status
of judges. 275 These concerns may have motivated courts to adopt a

267. Judd, supra note 14. The “no change for 30 years” policy does not in itself discriminate against
MOW. Under this policy, MOW may keep the land that they owns in their natal village. The discrimination
comes from MOW being denied compensation by the village collective following rural land expropriation.
268. Bo, supra note 100 (explaining that Chinese culture regarding land use is one reason women’s rights
are diminished in rural societies).
269. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9, at 753.
273. CHAN, supra note 156. See generally Peter C.H. Chan, An Uphill Battle: How China’s Obsession
with Social Stability is Blocking Judicial Reform, 100 JUDICATURE 14 (2016) (offering a critical appraisal of
China’s contemporary judicial reform); Peter C.H. Chan, Civil Mediation in Imperial, Republican and
Modern-Day China: Historical and Cultural Norms under the Traditional Chinese Legal Order, 85 TVR [LEG.
HIST. REV.] 577 (2017) (documenting a historical account of China’s mediation system); Peter C.H. Chan,
Opciones de Mediación para Resolver Disputas Comerciales en China [Mediation Options for Resolving
Commercial Disputes in China], 41 REV. CHILEAN DER. 153 (2014) (giving an overview of China’s
contemporary commercial mediation system); Peter C.H. Chan, The Enigma of Civil Justice in Imperial
China: A Legal Historical Enquiry, 19 MAASTRICH. J. EUR. & COMP. L. 317 (2012) (exploring a legal
historical overview of China’s civil justice system).
274. He, supra note 23, at 329.
275. Recent judicial reform clearly aimed to enhance the image of Chinese courts as a way to “regain the
public’s trust and confidence in the system.” See CHAN, supra note 156, at 241. Previously, the Chinese court
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redistributive approach when adjudicating MOW disputes.276 MOW litigation
has become less sensitive than before. 277 One informant said the village
collective is unlikely to “stir things up” if the court ruled in favor of MOW.278
By leveling the playing field for the “have-nots” (MOW), the Chinese courts
can establish their public image as vanguards of gender equality, but bear
minimal political risk.279 Since DADs are required to be uploaded online by the
SPC, courts understand the negative public relations implications if their
decisions are found to be inconsistent or biased in favor of the privileged.280
Since DADs are made public, ruling in favor of the weak promotes the courts’
public image like no other campaign could.
D. LAWYER CAPABILITY
The role of lawyers in shaping litigation outcomes has been widely
discussed.281 From the data, the impact of legal representation on the plaintiff’s
(MOW) success is mainly negative with two exceptional situations. The
bivariate analysis in Table 11a shows plaintiffs without legal representation
had a higher success rate. With the exception of two situations, shown in Table
12e & Table 12g, the three-way cross-tabs analysis presents a similar trend
identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a (for example, the plaintiff
without legal representation had a higher rate of success). This is an atypical
situation since under the party capability theory, lawyers should play a positive
role in shaping the outcome.282 For example, a study found that experienced

was criticized for its over-reliance on judicial mediation and abdication from the role of the rule-enforcer. See
Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 939 (2011).
276. The main objective of China’s most recent judicial reform is to establish a system where “the people
feel that justice is done in every single court case.” CHAN, supra note 157; see also Guanyu Quanmian
Shenhua Renmin Fayuan Gaige De Yijian, Renmin Fayuan Disi Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (关于全面深化
人民法院改革的意见—人民法院第四个五年改革纲要 (2014–2018)) [Opinions of the Supreme People’s
Court on Comprehensive Deepening of Reform of People’s Courts—The 4th Five-Year Outline of the
Program for Reform of People’s Courts (2014–2018)] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 4, 2015,
effective Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2015/02/id/148096.shtml (China).
277. But see Randall Peerenboom, Economic and Social Rights: The Role of Courts in China, 12 SAN
DIEGO INT’L LAW J. 303 (2011).
278. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156 (explaining that
unsuccessful village collectives seldom appeal and almost never petition against the court decision) (xinfang)
see also Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250 (noting that enforcement
of MOW-favoring judgments, which used to be difficult in the past due to resistance from some villages, is no
longer a problem today).
279. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156. The informant is of
the view that the MOW litigant can place more political pressure on the courts (through xinfang), than village
collectives. Id.
280. Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250.
281. See, e.g., John Szmer et al., supra note 130130, at 298 (“Litigation team experience and size affect
the Court’s decisionmaking, even after controlling for several factors, including ideology and party
capability.”).
282. See Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250. An informant holds
the contrary view that lawyers help the MOW’s case by offering useful strategies, such as inquiring about the
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lawyers are like RPs who can reverse the disadvantageous position of OSlitigants.283 Another study found that represented “have-nots” came out ahead
in the Israeli High Courts of Justice, the same court in which the unrepresented
“have-nots” were losing. 284 One possible explanation for unrepresented
plaintiff’s (MOW) higher success is that the Chinese court sympathizes with
them and adopts a more relaxed approach, both procedurally and in deciding
the substantive case, as compared to plaintiffs who had representation.285
The data in Table 11b shows that whenever the defendant had legal
representation, MOW litigants lost more often, independent of whether or not
the plaintiff had legal representation. 286 This is consistent with the party
capability theory of lawyers.
The data in Table 11a shows that most plaintiffs had legal representation
(77.69%). The proportion of plaintiffs having legal representation is higher
than that of defendants. The plaintiffs’ legal representatives are attorneys from
professional law firms, not “street lawyers” or paralegals (Table 11c). This
contradicts the view that “have-nots” are less likely to be able to find quality
representation.287
E.

OTHER OBSERVATIONS

It appears the court takes procedural irregularity of the allocation process
seriously. As shown in Table 16b, MOW is 100% successful when the court
finds procedural defect in the allocation agreement.288
Some studies have suggested that petitions by MOW (xinfang) have
exerted pressure on local courts. 289 The data does not offer a conclusive
answer. As shown in Table 17, while MOW did not lose a single case when the
petition result was provided in the DAD,290 in cases where no outcome of the
petition was provided, the losing rate of MOW is higher than that when no
Previous Citizens’ Petition was lodged.291
It is still true that in certain regions—such as various regions in
Guangdong Province—courts would only accept MOW cases when an
attitudes of the courts before commencing litigation or bringing a “test case” to test the waters before other
MOW commence proceedings. Id. Galanter, supra note 1, at 114–19.
283. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in
Litigation Success, 57 J. POLITICS 187, 190–91 (1995).
284. Dotan, supra note 7, at 1077.
285. CHAN, supra note 156.
286. The above three-way cross-tabs analysis in Table 14a, Table 14b and Table 14j confirms the trend
identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a. For example, the defendant with legal representation had a
higher rate of success.
287. Galanter, supra note 1, at 114–119.
288. 80% complete win, 20% partial win. But the rate of frequency of allocation agreements having
procedural defects is rather low (2.02%) (n=496). See Table 16b.
289. Chen & Gao, supra note 99; see also Gui, supra note 96, at 168.
290. This covers whether or not the Previous Citizens’ Petition was favorable to the MOW.
291. In cases where no outcome of the petition was provided, the MOW’s losing rate was 11.11%. In
cases where no Previous Citizens’ Petition was lodged, the MOW’s losing rate was 6.12%.
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administrative ruling on the village collective membership issue had been
issued.292 From the data in Table 17, it appears that the MOW never lost a
court case with a favorable prior administrative ruling and never won a court
case with an unfavorable prior administrative ruling. Thus, courts place a high
premium on prior administrative decisions regarding MOW disputes.
Another observation from Table 17 is that, when MOW have litigated the
issue before,293 and subsequently won,294 their success rate in the subsequent
court proceedings is 100%.295 This confirms the view that an OS-litigant, with
some prior and relevant litigation experience, can emerge as a party with
certain RP attributes because of the previous experience and enjoy advantages
of the RP in the subsequent lawsuit.296
It appears the reverse logic is true about “have-nots” winning due to the
court favoring the MOW. When the court is determined to uphold “village
autonomy,” the MOW litigant has a much greater chance of losing the case.
From the data (Tables 16a and 16b), MOW have not won a single case when
the court has approved the decision of the village collective on the MOW’s
membership status, whether on the basis of the villagers’ charter or allocation
agreement.
Studies have shown that provincial legislation that protects individual
rights is very important in the judicial enforcement of such rights.297 This is
borne out in the data in Table 14c, where whenever any provincial statute that
protect women’s rights was applied in the case, MOW prevailed 100% of the
time. The same is true when the court applied pro-MOW provincial judicial
rules.
The data shows that most MOW have either moved to their husbands’
villages or stayed in the natal villages after marriage (with a frequency rate of
90.67%). As seen in Table 8c, only a small fraction have moved to the cities
(with a frequency rate of 9.33%). This reinforces the view that the MOW issue
in China is, by nature, mainly a rural issue.

292. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Female, Judge, Guangdong Province Basic-Level Court (Apr.
13, 2018) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Guangdong Province].
293. These previous lawsuits mostly concern the same MOW litigant suing the same village collective for
government compensation in prior land expropriations.
294. There are quite a number of these cases: the rate of frequency is 13.47% (n=802). See supra Table 17.
295. Complete win being 79.63% and partial win being 20.37%. See supra Table 17. An alternative
explanation for the MOW litigant’s greater success is that she had already received judicial confirmation of her
membership in the previous lawsuit.
296. In fact, more MOW litigants are now organizing themselves in groups to campaign for their cause
and exert pressure on the government. See, e.g., Bo, supra note 100, at 117 (the “one person one letter to the
People’s Congress” (一人一信到人大) campaign in Guangdong Province); see also XUANCHENG FUNV WANG
[WOMEN’S NETWORK OF XUANCHENG CITY], http://www.ahxcwomen.gov.cn/plus/view.php?aid=225
(last updated Apr. 26, 2018) (listing updates on collective actions of MOW); Susan D. Franck & Linsey E.
Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 501 (2015).
297. See, e.g., Cheng and Ke, supra note 80 (explaining the impact of provincial and local labor rules on
labor dispute adjudication).
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LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

Despite its novel discoveries, this study has a number of limitations. First,
the number of “losing” cases for the MOW is relatively small. As such, the
significance of some variables in the variation of the outcome is unknown, as
chi-square tests cannot be performed when the samples are too small. If the
overall sample is increased to more than 858 sampled DADs, it is believed that
chi-square tests can be performed on all variables. Second, the study does not
shed light on the causal relations between the variables and the outcome of the
case, which requires more delicate statistical modeling. Third, the study does
not provide an exposition on the situation on a national level of married-out
women being denied access to court, a problem that has persisted for many
years. 298 An informant confirms, 299 however, that few courts today would
reject cases filed by MOW in one particular province,300 and another informant
noted that the problem has significantly improved in another province,301 but
only after the implementation of the SPC Case-Filing Registration Rules.302
The data shows that there is an explosion in the number of MOW lawsuits
since 2014, which seems to suggest that access to court has improved. 303
Nevertheless, these are piecemeal evidence only, and a more thorough
empirical study is necessary to gauge the actual reality of the problem. Overall,
this study focuses on the litigation aspect of the MOW issue and not on the outof-court dispute resolution process. Fourth, this study does not touch upon
cases withdrawn by the plaintiffs or settled by the parties, information that may
shed light on the RP’s long-term litigation strategies.304 But these types of
cases are publicly unavailable and would require extensive field investigation
to collect. Finally, the study sampled DADs that are available online. It is
expected that courts will not disclose all DADs, as some of them may be
politically sensitive. The sample, therefore, cannot be completely
representative using publicly available sources.305 However, given that MOW
lawsuits have become a type of run-of-the-mill case,306 it is expected that the
proportion of undisclosed DADs is very small.307

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

He, supra note 23, at 204.
Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250.
Jiangxi Province.
Hubei Province.
Interview with Anonymous Male Attorney, supra note 250.
See supra Table 1.
Galanter, supra note 1, at 125 fig.3.
He and Su, supra note 2, at 128.
Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250.
See supra Table 4.
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The main contribution of this Article is the empirical discovery that the
“have-nots” (the MOW litigants) came out ahead in China’s courts by a
substantial margin. This finding contradicts Galanter’s party capability theory
(under which the “haves” should prevail) and the established view that the
“haves” should come out ahead in China (a leading study on Shanghai courts
found the “haves” prevailing by large margins). This Article shows that
Galanter’s party capability theory is inapplicable when the courts favor the
weaker party and are determined to level the playing field between the “haves”
and the “have-nots.” The data shows that the Chinese courts in MOW lawsuits
favored the MOW litigant. The courts sided with MOW litigants out of
sympathy for MOW, whom, in the courts’ view, were being unfairly treated by
the village collectives. The courts may have also sided with the MOW litigants
as a strategic consideration to establish the courts’ own legitimacy through
protecting the weak. It is believed that the courts’ favor for the “have-nots”
(MOW) neutralized the party-capability advantages enjoyed by the “haves”
(village collectives) and ultimately propelled the “have-nots” to victory.
This Article also shows that the lack of judicial independence in China,
which enhances the likelihood of courts being swayed by powerful external
influence in favor of the stronger party, does not necessarily guarantee victory
for the “haves.”308 The Chinese judiciary, like any judicial institution in the
developing world where the legitimacy of the court is not a pre-existing feature
of the political system, would strive to establish a public image of the rightsprotector and resource redistributor, at least in “some components of their
docket.”309 MOW lawsuits happen to fall within this category of cases. Chinese
courts, after evaluating the political risks involved, sided with the “have-nots”
(MOW) as part of an exercise to build up the courts’ legitimacy.
Aside from its theoretical contribution to the party capability theory, this
study offers insight into the role of the judiciary in Chinese society, the
protection of rural women’s land rights in China, and other issues with
potential policy implications. First, the study contributes to the debate on
whether China has judicial independence. Previously, China’s grassroots
courts were seen as partial and relatively weak, and even corrupt institutions
that were susceptible to external interference, such as the local government and
rural organizations. It follows that the privileged and the powerful are likely to
have an advantage in litigation, given their connections and superior resources.
This study shows that the Chinese grassroots court, to a certain degree and in
specific situations, is capable of withstanding external pressure to bring about
just outcomes.

308. Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250.
309. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9, at 753.
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Second, the study shows that grassroots courts can be effective rightsenforcers—in this case, by tackling gender inequality—when the opportunity
presents itself and when the political risks of enforcing such rights are
manageable.
Third, the study shows that China is moving in the right direction (in line
with international norms) by protecting rural women’s land rights in civil
cases. The findings will help the CEDAW Committee and China understand
the MOW issue in more concrete terms and better focus their dialogue going
forward.
Fourth, this research shows that, even in an authoritarian state,
government-connected institutions—the village collective—do not always win
in lawsuits brought by the individual “commoner.” The outcome of the case
does not depend entirely upon the litigant’s political connections and
institutional strength. Finally, despite the central government’s policy of
respecting rural self-governance, this study suggests that grassroots courts are
capable, given the right circumstances, of penetrating local customs and
practices, as well as providing direct remedies to rights-seeking claimants.
Hopefully, future research can build on this study and add to the debate
on Galanter’s theory, rural women’s rights protection in China, and the role of
the judiciary in the Chinese society.

